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Introduction
Millions of rural poor people in developing countries depend on natural resources—farmland
and rangeland, fishing waters, forests—for their livelihoods. But whether they can use these
resources sustainably to climb out of poverty often depends on the institutions that govern
resource use—property rights and collective action. A multiplicity of property rights and col-
lective action arrangements exist around the globe, and researchers have learned numerous
lessons about what kinds of arrangements work best under what conditions. Making property
rights and collective action work for the poor is not as simple as issuing new land titles or
mindlessly applying standards that have worked elsewhere. Instead, it requires a detailed
understanding of local resource conditions and social relationships, among other factors.
This collection of briefs draws on a wide body of research conducted through the System-
wide Program on Collective Action and Property Rights (CAPRi) of the Consultative Group
on International Agricultural Research (CGIAR). It describes the complex issues surrounding
property rights and collective action that policymakers and development professionals must
understand and address if they are to successfully promote sustainable and pro-poor manage-
ment of natural resources. We are grateful to editors Ruth Meinzen-Dick and Monica Di
Gregorio, as well as all of the contributors, for their insights on this crucial topic.
Joachim von Braun Rajul Pandya-Lorch
Director General Head, 2020 Vision InitiativeI
nstitutions of collective action and systems of property rights
shape how people use natural resources,and these patterns of
use in turn affect the outcomes of people’s agricultural produc-
tion systems.Together,mechanisms of collective action and
property rights define the incentives people face for undertaking
sustainable and productive management strategies,and they
affect the level and distribution of benefits from natural
resources.The linkages between property rights,collective
action,and natural resource management have important impli-
cations for technology adoption,economic growth,food
security,poverty reduction,and environmental sustainability.Yet
despite their importance in people’s lives,property rights and
collective action are often undervalued,and when they are
recognized,often misunderstood.
WHAT ARE PROPERTY RIGHTS AND 
COLLECTIVE ACTION?
Collective action is often considered narrowly in terms of formal
organizations,and property rights only in terms of formal title
issued by the government.In fact,they are much more than that.
Collective action can be defined as voluntary action taken
by a group to achieve common interests.Members can act
directly on their own or through an organization.In the context
of natural resource management,even deciding on and observing
rules for use or non-use of a resource can be considered collec-
tive action,and it can be instituted through common property
regimes or through coordinated activities across individual farms.
Property rights can be defined as “the capacity to call upon
the collective to stand behind one’s claim to a benefit stream”
(Bromley 1991).Rights do not necessarily imply full ownership
and the sole authority to use and dispose of a resource;different
individuals,families,groups,or even the state often hold overlap-
ping use and decisionmaking rights.To be secure,rights should be
of sufficient duration to allow one to reap the rewards of invest-
ment and should be backed by an effective,socially sanctioned
enforcement institution.This institution is not always the govern-
ment;communities or other institutions may provide the backing.
LINKS TO SUSTAINABILITY OF NATURAL
RESOURCE MANAGEMENT AND AGRICULTURAL
SYSTEMS
The following figure illustrates how property rights and collec-
tive action affect the application of agricultural technologies and
natural resource management practices.Conventional on-farm
technologies like improved,high-yielding crop varieties (HYVs)
have a short,usually seasonal,time horizon and a small spatial
scale,often a single plot.They can be adopted by a single farmer—
even by a tenant.Other technologies may require longer time
horizons between their adoption and their payoff.In those situa-
tions,farmers need secure tenure (property rights) to have the
incentive and authority to adopt.For example,tenants are often
not allowed to plant trees or lack incentives to do terracing.
Moving from on-farm technologies to those that operate at larger
spatial scales implies a greater need for collective action to make
the technology work.Integrated pest management (IPM),for
example,must be coordinated across farms 
Most natural resource management practices have both
long time and large spatial scales.Both property rights and
collective action are therefore crucial for the management of
forests,rangelands,fisheries,watersheds,or irrigation systems
that serve more than a single farm.In some cases,the scale of
the resource to be managed may go beyond what can be done
by voluntary collective action by a community.Federations of
user groups may sometimes be able to manage larger resources,
but often the state or even international bodies become criti-
cally important partners.In these cases,co-management
between the community and government,rather than govern-
ment management alone,often leads to better outcomes.
Property rights and collective action also affect natural
resource management and agricultural production systems in
interaction with other factors such as information,wealth,risk,
labor,and marketing.Collective action and networks among
community members can facilitate access to information and
even allow farmers to participate in technology development.
Ownership of assets can serve as collateral for obtaining credit.
Microfinance programs have shown that action through groups
can also provide access to credit,with social bonds providing
collateral.Rights over common property resources frequently
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function as a buffer against risk,especially environmental events
and loss of other livelihoods.Similarly,collective action enables
risk sharing and inspires mechanisms for collective self-help.
Collective action and reciprocity arrangements offer ways to
overcome labor shortages,especially for practices that require
intense labor effort in concentrated periods.
Property rights and collective action are also interde-
pendent.This is particularly clear in the case of common
property regimes,where holding rights in common reinforces
collective action among members,and collective action is
needed to manage the resource.Maintaining property rights can
require collective action,especially in the case of landscape-level
resources and where outsiders challenge local claims  
LINKS TO POVERTY REDUCTION
Property rights and collective action affect people’s livelihoods.
The most vulnerable and marginalized rural groups often lack
access to resources (that is,they have no or insecure property
rights) and find participation in collective action too costly
because of lack of time and resources.Enhancing rights to even
relatively small homestead plots can increase food security by
allowing women to grow gardens,and rights to common
property often provide insurance for the poor.Tenure security
provides key assets for poverty reduction,allowing the poor to
help themselves by growing food,investing in more productive
activities,or using property as collateral for credit.Collective
action can increase food security through mutual insurance.
Both property rights and collective action are empowerment
tools.Poor people often have difficulty making their voices heard.
Interventions to strengthen their property rights or to help them
participate in collective activities improve their bargaining
positions.Security of rights and the capacity to manage local
common resources allow people to make decisions while taking
the future into consideration.This longer-term approach generally
translates into more environmentally sustainable management
practices and a healthier resource base for future generations.
IMPLICATIONS FOR POLICY AND PRACTICE
Many countries are now adopting policies to devolve the manage-
ment of forests,fisheries,irrigation,watersheds,or rangelands to
local communities or to develop some form of co-management
between the state and communities.In addition,community-driven
development initiatives are helping local organizations to set
priorities for local public service spending and to provide services
such as schools and health centers.For these programs to
succeed,effective collective action within communities is essential.
As the briefs on forestry,irrigation,fisheries,and rangelands
in this series show,successful collective action does not always
emerge,especially where traditional management institutions
(like tribes on rangelands) have been weakened by migration or
excessive state intervention.Government agencies need to
change how they work with communities,becoming more
conscious in their efforts to strengthen local management insti-
tutions and allowing more local decisionmaking without
imposing external rules.
Devolution programs that transfer management responsibility
for natural resources from government agencies to farmers often
fail to transfer corresponding rights.Yet rights over the resource
are needed to provide groups with the incentives to conserve and
even invest in the resources.Without recognized decisionmaking
rights,the groups lack the authority to manage the resource or to
stop members or outsiders from breaking the rules.Recognized
property rights not only reinforce collective action that is needed
for collective management,but also provide security for individuals
and households. Several briefs in this collection suggest ways of
strengthening property rights for the poor.
Many other government and nongovernmental organiza-
tions involved in community development are addressing collec-
tive action issues,whether through revolving credit or livestock
schemes,agricultural extension groups,or domestic water
supply.There is a wealth of practical experience on ways to
organize or strengthen collective action.Researchers have docu-
mented factors that affect collective action,but their findings are
often based on a few successful case studies.Much more needs
to be learned about what approaches do and do not foster
collective action that continues beyond the project intervention,
as well as about how externally induced organizations interact
with indigenous institutions for collective action.Promising
approaches suggested by briefs in this collection include using
facilitators,community organizers,or farmer-to-farmer learning;
providing groups with credit to make investments and create
property rights;and increasing access to technical information
about resources. As collective action grows,local groups are
forming federations up to the national level to address their
problems at appropriate levels and to gain a voice in policy
decisions,including critical issues of rights to resources.  
For further reading see D. Bromley, Environment and
Economy: Property Rights and Public Policy (Cambridge, MA:
Basil Blackwell, 1991); R. Meinzen-Dick,A. Knox, F. Place,
and B. Swallow, eds., Innovation in Natural Resource
Management:The Role of Property Rights and Collective Action
in Developing Countries (Baltimore: John Hopkins University
Press, 2002); R. Meinzen-Dick,A. Knox, and M. Di Gregorio,
eds., Collective Action, Property Rights, and Devolution of
Natural Resource Management: Exchange of Knowledge and
Implications for Policy (Feldafing, Germany: German
Foundation for International Development [DSE]/Food 
and Agriculture Development Centre [ZEL], 2001),
http://www.capri.cgiar.org/workshop_devolution.asp; and 
A. Knox, R. Meinzen-Dick, and P. Hazell,“Property Rights,
Collective Action, and Technologies for Natural Resource
Management,” CAPRi Working Paper 1 (Washington, DC:
IFPRI, 1998), http://www.capri.cgiar.org/pdf/capriwp01.pdf.
Also visit the CAPRi website at http://www.capri.cgiar.org.
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ELINOR OSTROM
UNDERSTANDING COLLECTIVE ACTION AND
COLLECTIVE ACTION PROBLEMS
C
ollective action occurs when more than one individual is
required to contribute to an effort in order to achieve an
outcome. People living in rural areas and using natural
resources engage in collective action on a daily basis when they  
• plant or harvest food together;
• use a common facility for marketing their products;
• maintain a local irrigation system or patrol a local forest to
see that users are following rules; and 
• meet to decide on rules related to all of the above.
Frequently, however, it becomes difficult to exclude nonpar-
ticipants from benefiting from the collective action of others.
This situation creates a collective action problem for the partic-
ipants.When individuals seek out short-term benefits for them-
selves alone, they are better off when others contribute to the
collective action and they do not. In this case, they benefit
without paying the costs. Of course, if all individuals pursue
short-term, self-centered benefits, no collective benefits are
achieved.
CAN PARTICIPANTS OVERCOME THE 
COLLECTIVE ACTION PROBLEMS THEY FACE?
Some theoretical treatises assume that individuals are unable to
overcome the temptation to pursue short-term,“selfish”
benefits.According to this view, effective collective action can
be achieved only if external policymakers impose government
or private ownership. It is true that appropriately designed
property rights systems can help individuals overcome collec-
tive action problems, but such systems need not always be
externally imposed or involve government or private
ownership. Indeed, efforts by national governments to impose
uniform rules on large stretches of land involving diverse
ecological and sociological systems have frequently led to
worsening natural resource conditions rather than improve-
ments. Outsiders’ efforts to impose property rights often fail to
take into account indigenous property rights and the organiza-
tions that individuals themselves have established over time.
Many local indigenous institutions have evolved as the
people affected have tried to find better ways of organizing
joint activities. Indigenous methods for engaging in collective
action have sometimes survived for centuries, through floods,
fires, pests, overpopulation, and warfare.These institutions may
not be recorded in any formal records and are frequently
unknown except to local participants.
Any effort to influence policies for managing water, range-
lands, forests, fisheries, and other natural resources must take
into account factors that increase the likelihood that individuals
will engage in their own collective action to manage local
resources. By understanding these factors and developing
policies to enhance them, national and international agencies
can increase the level of collective action generated at the local
level.The efforts of national and international agencies can then
be devoted to large-scale collective action problems that do
require their attention and effort.
Policymakers sometimes want to learn the precise formula
that will solve a particular problem. Extensive research has
shown, however, that no blueprints exist that can reliably be
used to solve collective action problems, either within or across
sectors. Instead of uniform blueprints, research has highlighted
broad design principles that have been used by successful
groups. Furthermore, researchers have identified the attributes
of groups and resources that facilitate successful solutions to
these problems.
WHAT PARTICIPANT ATTRIBUTES ARE
CONDUCIVE TO OVERCOMING COLLECTIVE
ACTION PROBLEMS?
The first characteristic of successful efforts is agreement by the
involved individuals that the problem at hand is an important
one.At first this characteristic sounds trivial, but it is not.
Government agencies frequently complain that local popula-
tions do not perceive collective action problems as either
relevant to their concerns or within their abilities to address. In
regard to the conservation of wildlife, for example, residents
living around a reserve frequently find themselves paying high
costs and receiving few benefits for the presence of the wildlife
reserve. If people’s crops are eaten, their animals are threat-
ened, and even the lives of their children are at risk, they will
need to see substantial and tangible benefits from the establish-
ment of a park before they will see any reason to engage in
collective action to preserve wildlife.
A second factor is the degree of autonomy a group has to
take collective action on its own or within a nested institutional
setting, and this factor can depend on the macro political-insti-
tutional environment in which individuals find themselves. For
many local groups, past attempts to take collective action
proved dangerous. In a highly authoritarian regime, independent
action is perceived as threatening to the center. Individuals who
have lived in such regimes for long periods of time are always
nervous about independent action, even when assured that the
regime has changed. In addition, the capacity to create a private
association without long and bureaucratic processes or
expensive filing of documents greatly enhances the capabilities
of local people to solve problems.
Other factors relate to the way users of a resource view
both the future and each other. If users have a high discount
rate in regard to a particular resource—that is, they view exit
FOR FOOD,AGRICULTURE,
AND THE ENVIRONMENTElinor Ostrom (ostrom@indiana.edu) is codirector of the Center for the Study of Institutions, Population, and Environmental Change and of the Workshop in
Political Theory and Policy Analysis at Indiana University.
as a reasonable short-term option—there is little motivation
to put in extensive time and effort to create a sustainable,
long-term governance system.Those who have overcome
collective action problems usually have a relatively low
discount rate in relation to the particular problem at hand.
Secure property rights for the group can help reinforce a long-
term perspective. Participants must also have some level of
trust in the reliability of others and be willing to use broad
strategies of reciprocity. If participants fear that others are
going to take advantage of them, no one will wish to initiate
costly actions only to find that others are not reciprocating.
Prior organizational experience and the presence of supportive
local leaders also reduce the transaction costs that must be
paid before finding possible solutions.
WHAT RESOURCE SYSTEM ATTRIBUTES ARE 
CONDUCIVE TO OVERCOMING COLLECTIVE
ACTION PROBLEMS?
Overcoming collective action problems is always a challenge.
Four factors enhance the likelihood that local users will move
toward devising institutions for sustainable development:
1. The flow of resource units,such as fish,water,or forest
products,is relatively predictable.
2. Resources are scarce but not entirely destroyed.
3. Reliable and valid indicators of the condition of the
resource system are available locally at reasonable costs.
4. The resource system is moderately sized.
The presence of all four conditions enhances the proba-
bility that local users can come to a common understanding of
the nature of the system they are using and of how their own
collective action can create rules about who uses how many of
the resource units and where, when, and how these uses are
allowed. It is important to note that not every group facing
favorable conditions is successful in organizing itself and
sustaining that organization over time. Nor are groups with
less positive conditions fated to fail forevermore.
Collective action problems are found within the councils
of the highest levels of government as well as those related to
local resource management. It is important for policymakers to
understand both the importance of local initiatives and the
difference that external authorities can make by enabling
groups to take initiative and experiment with diverse local
institutions and by affecting some of the conditions through
the policy environment.
WHAT CAN BE DONE?
Imposing top-down,detailed prescriptions for “solving” collective
action problems by policymakers located far from particular
collective action problems has rarely been a successful strategy.
National agencies can nonetheless accomplish a great deal by  
•  providing accurate information about natural resource
systems,such as groundwater replenishment rates,geolog-
ical structure,and long-term precipitation records;
•  recording key information about the behavior of wildlife
and fisheries not available to local users;
•  providing arenas for low-cost conflict resolution;
•  designing mechanisms for discourse and debate by local
users in their effort to learn from one another and
discover new strategies;
•  disseminating information about successful organizations
and the design principles that characterize them;and
•  creating institutional mechanisms that local participants can
use to organize themselves,such as through special
districts,private associations,and local/regional govern-
ments.
It is also important that policymakers not presume that
they are the only relevant actors in efforts to solve collective
action problems.They have partners if they are willing to
recognize them.  
For further reading see A. Poteete and E. Ostrom,“An
Institutional Approach to the Study of Forest Resources”
(Indiana University, Bloomington, IN, 2002), http://www.
indiana.edu/~workshop/W01-8_counter.html; National
Research Council, The Drama of the Commons (Washington,
DC: National Academies Press, 2002); and C. C. Gibson,
M. McKean, and E. Ostrom, People and Forests: Communities,
Institutions, and Governance (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press,
2000).
International Food Policy Research Institute
2033 K Street, N.W. •  Washington, D.C. 20006-1002  •  U.S.A.
Phone: +1-202-862-5600  •  Fax: +1-202-467-4439
Email: ifpri@cgiar.org
www.ifpri.org
CGIAR System-wide Program on
COLLECTIVE ACTION AND 
PROPERTY RIGHTS
www.capri.cgiar.orgC
ollecting firewood from a forest or water from a stream,
grazing a herd,felling trees,preventing entry to a protected
area,and making decisions about who should or should not have
rights to collect firewood or water are all expressions of the
exercise of property rights to natural resources.
Property rights govern who can do what with resources.
They specify the claims and related obligations of different
actors—individuals or groups—to the benefits of a resource.
The assigned set of rights and obligations shape the authority
and incentives structure of the rights holder.
MANY TYPES OF RIGHTS
People often think about property rights in a narrow sense as
ownership—the right to completely and exclusively control a
resource. But property rights are better understood as over-
lapping “bundles” of rights. There are many combinations of
such rights, but they can often be grouped as  
•  use rights,such as the right to access the resource (for
example,to walk across a field),withdraw from a resource
(pick some wild plants),or exploit a resource for economic
benefit;and
•  control or decisionmaking rights,such as the rights to
management (plant a crop),exclusion (prevent others from
accessing the field),and alienation (rent out,sell,or give
away the rights).
These rights may also be conditioned by the amount,timing,
and other aspects of resource use and management.Several indi-
viduals or groups may have different kinds of rights over the
same resource.For example,all members of a community may
be allowed to bathe in a river or collect drinking water,but only
certain farmers may be allowed to draw water for irrigating
fields and to decide how to distribute that water in the dry
season,while the state may claim ultimate “ownership” of the
water,including the right to reassign it to others. Even on land
declared as state forest land,individuals from a community may
have the right to collect medicinal plants or fallen branches for
firewood (use),local groups may have the right to plant trees
(management) and guard them (exclusion),but the state may
retain the right to approve any felling of trees and to collect
revenue from users.
LEGAL PLURALISM:MANY SOURCES OF RIGHTS
To recognize property rights in practice,we need to look beyond
state-issued titles to the resource. As illustrated in the figure,
there are multiple sources of property rights,including:
•  international treaties and law;
•  state (or statutory) law;
•  religious law and accepted religious practices;
•  customary law,which may be formal written custom or
living interpretations of custom;
•  project (or donor) law,including project or program regu-
lations;and
•  organizational law,such as rules made by user groups.
To understand this complexity,it is useful to start from
people’s experiences with access to and control over resources.
From this vantage point it is clear that people draw upon a
range of strategies for claiming and obtaining resources,
depending on their knowledge and assessment of which best
suit their situation.
The coexistence of these laws does not mean that all laws
are equal or equally powerful. Each is only as strong as the
institution that stands behind it. Often state law is more
powerful and used by government officials,for example,to
declare and enforce forests as state property.Statutory law is
also used by powerful outsiders,such as logging companies with
concessions in customary lands,to claim resources in ways that
are not locally recognized as legitimate.On the other hand,
actions of local communities,such as petitions,demonstrations,
and roadblocks,are ways of claiming locally recognized rights as
well as seeking recognition of their rights by the state.
In some cases state law,although important,is not as
relevant as the village,ethnic community,or user group in deter-
Coexisting Multiple Sources of Property Rights
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mining property rights on the ground. For example,state laws
on inheritance are often ignored in favor of religious laws or
local custom. Research has shown that state titling programs do
not always provide stronger security than customary rights and
may even be a source of insecurity for women and households
with less information or fewer connections to obtain govern-
ment land registration.
While legal pluralism can create uncertainty because rival
claimants can use a large legal repertoire to claim a resource,
multiple legal frameworks also provide flexibility for people to
maneuver in their use of natural resources.
PROPERTY RIGHTS AS FLEXIBLE AND DYNAMIC
SYSTEMS
Often the more variable the resource,the more flexible are the
property rights that develop over it. Water rights are particu-
larly fluid,changing by season and year,depending on the avail-
ability of the resource and demands for water. Similarly,many
customary rangeland management systems negotiate access
rights depending on factors like weather and the social relations
between the groups.This flexibility provides a measure of
security in times of drought or other disasters,by creating recip-
rocal expectations of resource sharing between groups.
Another source of change in property rights comes from
the interaction between types of law. The different legal frame-
works do not exist in isolation, but influence each other.
Changes in state law can influence local custom, but changes in
customary practices can also lead to changes in state law. For
state law to be effective on the ground, it must be implemented
effectively. Legal literacy programs may be needed to inform
the public—and even government officials—about changes in
the laws.
How exactly these different legal orders influence each
other depends on power relationships between the “bearers” of
different laws.Power relationships also determine the distribu-
tion of rights and whether people can effectively claim their
rights.Actual rights to natural resources are therefore a product
of locality,history,changes in resource condition and use,
ecology,and social relationships and are subject to negotiation.




Effective resource management entails balancing benefit entitle-
ments and responsibilities of property rights. After failing to
effectively manage natural resource systems centrally, many
governments are now undertaking decentralization and devolu-
tion programs to transfer responsibility for resource manage-
ment to local governments and user groups. Unfortunately,
many such programs emphasize the transfer of responsibilities
without transferring the corresponding rights. As a result, user
groups may lack the incentive, and even the authority, to
manage the resource.
When devolution programs do transfer rights over
resources to a user group or local government, that institution
becomes the gatekeeper determining individuals’ rights over the
resource. Effective voice in those organizations becomes
essential to exercising any decisionmaking rights over the
resource. This situation can be especially problematic for
women when formal rules limit membership to the “head of
household” or when social norms make it unacceptable for
women to speak up in public. Because strengthening control
rights of some means restricting the use rights of others, those
who are not members of the group in question may have less
access to the resource.
Thus,while effective transfers of rights and responsibilities
from centralized government agencies to local organizations can
lead to more sustainable resource management,authorities must
give due attention to the equity outcomes,especially noting who
loses access to resources.
IMPLICATIONS 
Although property rights have a powerful influence on human
welfare and natural resource management,this key institution is
complex. Property rights do change over time,but legislative
reform alone is unlikely to change the manifestation of property
rights on the ground. Rather,change occurs through the social
and power relations and negotiations between different groups,
which may appeal to a variety of legal bases for claiming
property rights. Instead of looking for simple “solutions” to
property rights issues,it is more useful to try to understand the
complexity. This approach involves looking at the claims and the
bases of the claims made by individuals,groups,or government
entities to different bundles of rights over the resource and at
the different types of law that pertain to the use or management
of the resource. Security of tenure is important,but so is flexi-
bility to respond to changing conditions that affect resource use
and property rights.  
For further reading see R.Meinzen-Dick and R.Pradhan,
“Legal Pluralism and Dynamic Property Rights,” CAPRi
Working Paper 22 (Washington,DC:IFPRI,2002),
http://www.capri.cgiar.org/pdf/capriwp22.pdf;J.Spiertz and M.
G.Wiber,eds.,The Role of Law in Natural Resource
Management (The Hague,the Netherlands:VUGA,1996);B.R.
Bruns and R.S.Meinzen-Dick,eds.,Negotiating Water Rights
(New Delhi and London:Vistaar Publications and Intermediate
Technology Development Group Publishing,2000).
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Local-Level Public Goods and Collective Action
NANCY MCCARTHY
I
n communities throughout the world people work together
to provide goods and services that their governments do
not provide.They build and maintain local parks, feeder roads,
religious buildings, and community halls; they operate volunteer
fire control groups and establish rules for local natural
resource management. Sometimes local groups share responsi-
bilities for maintaining public services, such as schools and
health clinics, with their local or central governments.
Not all communities, however, provide the optimal level of
local public goods. Evidence shows that not only are some
public goods provided more often than others, but also that
some communities mobilize themselves more easily to provide
them. Given the vital importance of public goods in providing
basic services necessary for alleviating poverty and in managing
the local natural resource base for sustainable development,
this brief offers an approach to understanding the problems
communities face in providing different kinds of public goods.
WHY ARE SOME PUBLIC GOODS “EASIER” TO
PROVIDE THAN OTHERS?
Even within the same community, people cooperate to provide
certain public goods but not others. It is possible to explore
this variability by asking, How do one individual’s benefits
change depending on how many other people actually
contribute to a specific activity?  Using game theory to
examine an individual’s incentives to contribute to a public
good helps to highlight the exact nature of the interdepend-
ency among community members in terms of the decision to
contribute or not.
This brief considers five potential incentive structures that
are likely to be important empirically, although the actual
number of possibilities is much greater. In the first case, every
individual is better off contributing to the public good even if
no others contribute. In this case, the role of the group might
be only to share information and coordinate activities. Such an
incentive structure might occur when there are large
increasing returns to contributions in the provision of a public
good. Certain pest control measures might have this structure;
if each individual controls pests on his or her own farm, overall
pest prevalence may drop to zero, so everyone realizes large
benefits. Unfortunately, such a fortuitous incentive structure
does not occur often.
In the second case, the individual may be better off
contributing to the public good if no one else does, but when
others contribute the individual would prefer to “free ride,” or
contribute nothing.This case is often referred to as a “chicken
game.” As in the first case, the primary role of the group is to
coordinate actions among members. Coordination is particu-
larly important if the good must be repeatedly provided and
members can take turns in providing the good. Herd mobility
is such an example: each herder would prefer to stay at home
and avoid the costs of mobility but would rather move if
others remain at home. Coordinating herd movements can
lead to a socially optimal pattern of herd mobility.
In a third incentive structure, the individual might prefer to
contribute to the public good if all others do but would not if
no one else does—an example of an “assurance game.” In this
case, the role of the group is to assure each member that
others will not free ride. Given the incentive structure, this
case is likely to be more costly to manage than simply coordi-
nating movements as required under a “chicken game”
structure. Investments in community infrastructure sometimes
have this structure, particularly when investments are discrete
decisions, such as construction of a building or bridge.
In the fourth example the individual may prefer not to
contribute if no one else does and also prefer to free ride if
everyone else contributes—even though all members would
be better off if each one contributed his or her own share. In
this case, the incentive structure resembles a “prisoner’s
dilemma.” This situation is likely to occur when returns to
contributions increase but at a decreasing rate: for example,
certain soil erosion control measures. Such an incentive
structure may also result when returns are highly variable, as
they are, for example, for investments in agroforestry tech-
niques in regions with high climatic variability. Managing this
type of incentive structure is likely to be the most costly.
Finally, it may be the case that it would be best, under
existing conditions, not to provide the public good at all. In
other words, social returns to a certain public good may simply
be too low for it to be in the interest of the community
members to provide that good.
Several key factors determining externalities and incentive
structures include technological characteristics (such as the
returns to scale or if the good is discrete), costs of inputs, the
extent to which private goods can substitute for public goods,
and the uncertainty or variability in returns from the public
good.The provision of certain public goods may also affect the
returns to other public goods. For instance, returns to invest-
ments in soil erosion control measures undertaken on
common pastures may depend on collective action in managing
use rates of those pastures. Returns to improving roads and
bridges may be higher where successful pest control leads to
higher marketable crop surpluses.
Finally, actions in one community may affect returns to
activities elsewhere, such that groups operating across commu-
nities may be far more successful than more localized ones.
Pests, fires, and water easily cross community lines and
therefore require many communities to cooperate. Of course,
externalities that affect large segments of the population are
precisely those that give rise to government involvement. Real
and effective partnerships between government agencies and
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community groups can manage these externalities more
successfully.
WHY ARE SOME COMMUNITIES MORE 
SUCCESSFUL THAN OTHERS IN PROVIDING 
PUBLIC GOODS?
Although the incentive structure determines in part how difficult
it will be to undertake any particular collective activity,there are
also characteristics of the group that determine the cost of
doing so.
Any factors that enhance a group’s ability to identify
common goals,work together,and negotiate in good faith will
enhance cooperative capacity and thus reduce the costs of
undertaking collective action.Trust among members was one of
the first factors to be identified. A history of successful collec-
tive action also improves chances of continuing success in an
expanded set of activities,creating a virtuous circle.Social,
economic,and cultural heterogeneity have long been thought to
reduce cooperative capacity because such diversity makes it
difficult to find mutually beneficial arrangements.Sociocultural
diversity may also improve cooperative capacity,however,by
widening the possible set of cooperative arrangements and
avoiding institutional inertia.Recognition and support from
external agencies,such as government,enhances the authority of
the group to engage in collective action. More participatory
forums for setting the collective action agenda and implementing
activities,transparency and accountability mechanisms,and
credible and fair conflict resolution mechanisms all contribute to
successes in collective action.
Other factors may affect both cooperative capacity and
individual incentives.For instance,increases in group size may
increase individual incentives to free ride.On the other hand,
having more members can initially defray the costs per member.
As membership continues to increase,cooperation becomes
more costly owing to higher negotiation,monitoring,and
enforcement costs.Unequal distribution of wealth and opportu-
nities to work outside of the community also affect cooperative
capacity and incentives.
IMPLICATIONS FOR POLICYMAKERS
Where externalities are relatively localized,community
members may be better able to provide public goods because
they are more knowledgeable about local conditions than are
outsiders.As policymakers determine how best to aid communi-
ties in their quest to provide public goods,it is important that
they carefully consider both individual incentives to provide
particular public goods and the factors affecting communities’
capacity to cooperate.For instance,improving a community’s
capacity to cooperate will have spillover benefits for all public
goods provision and so might form part of a national strategy to
improve collective action.In highly heterogeneous communities,
however,a focus on conflict management and resolution mecha-
nisms may be the most useful intervention.Elsewhere,it may be
more relevant to disseminate information on organizational
tools.
Where policymakers are making decisions on devolving
responsibility for specific public goods to the community,they
must undertake a realistic assessment of individual incentives to
engage in collective action. This means assessing the underlying
technological characteristics,gauging the uncertainty,or the vari-
ability,of the benefits to be realized,and determining the extent
to which other public (or even private) goods and services
affect the potential returns from the particular activity. The
costs of making,monitoring,and enforcing agreements vary
according to the underlying incentive structure and are highest
in the “prisoner’s dilemma.” The appropriate organizational
structure,procedural rules for making and enforcing agreements,
and determination of fines or rewards will also differ depending
on the incentive structure,and projects and policies must take
this into account.
Finally,there are certain situations where institutions above
the local level need to operate. Under these conditions,local
groups and local and national government agencies need to
coordinate and cooperate through “co-management,” or nested
arrangements.The burden should not fall on communities alone.
The importance of determining the relative costs and
benefits of promoting community-based collective action before
wide-scale policies and programs are implemented cannot be
overemphasized,particularly in the context of government-led
devolution and decentralization policies.Without a clear under-
standing of costs and benefits,project managers and government
agencies may well impose upon the community the responsibility
for providing a public good or service for which social costs well
outweigh the benefits.Worse still,failure in collective action now
will have a negative impact on the capacity of the community to
engage in successful collective action in the future.  
For further reading see A.Knox,R.Meinzen-Dick,and P.
Hazell,“Property Rights,Collective Action,and Technologies
for Natural Resource Management:A Conceptual
Framework,” CAPRi Working Paper 1 (Washington,DC:
IFPRI,1998);E.Ostrom,Crafting Institutions for Self-Governing
Irrigation Systems (San Francisco: ICS Press,1992);T.Sandler,
Collective Action:Theory and Applications (Ann Arbor:
University of Michigan Press,1992);N.McCarthy,C.Dutilly-
Diané,and B. Drabo,“Cooperation,Collective Action and
Natural Resources Management in Burkina Faso:A
Methodological Note,” CAPRi Working Paper 27 (Washington
DC:IFPRI,2002).
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Property Rights, Collective Action, and Agroforestry
FRANK PLACE,K EIJIRO OTSUKA,AND SARA SCHERR
A
groforestry is about integrated agricultural systems in
which trees play a prominent role.Agroforestry can
provide a variety of functions or benefits for farmers and
communities.The most easily identifiable are the tree products
consumed by humans:fuelwood,timber,poles,fruits,medicines,
and resins.A second group of benefits consists of the services
provided by trees to other agricultural activities of the farmer:
fodder,green manure,shade,soil conservation,and stakes.A
third group includes the communitywide or even global benefits
from agroforestry systems:biodiversity,watershed protection,
carbon sequestration,and microclimate regulation.In this brief,
we explore the role that social institutions—specifically
property rights and collective action—may play in the develop-
ment of agroforestry.
Different agroforestry systems require different periods of
time to develop and manage.Depending upon what benefits are
sought,farmers will adopt varying degrees of joint action or
coordination within the landscape.Over longer time periods,
property rights increase in importance;over larger areas,collec-
tive action becomes more important.The figure shows how
different types of agroforestry outputs or activities will demand
different levels of property rights or collective action.
PROPERTY RIGHTS AND AGROFORESTRY
To justify investing in trees,a household or group must have
reasonable assurance of receiving the benefits from their invest-
ments.Investors must have confidence that tenure will be secure
in the future.In much of the world,the rights to plant,harvest,
and benefit from trees are linked to underlying land rights.In
places where individuals or households have acquired land on a
permanent basis,through purchase or inheritance for example,
they almost always have rights to plant and harvest trees.
Complications arise when government regulations protect a
particular tree,when a tree is naturally growing and perhaps
predates a household’s occupation of the land,or when there
are overlapping rights (for example,between two families).In
these cases rights to the trees may be contested.In the mailo
tenure system in Uganda,both owners and long-term tenants
claim strong rights to land.Customary or formal legal rules may
grant certain tree rights to non-landowners.The poor may be
granted collection rights to fallen tree fruits or dead branches
for fuelwood,or pastoralists may be given access to tree fodder
in the dry season.
There are also situations where rights and incentives to
plant trees are weak.This is the case with land acquired on a
temporary basis,for example,through sharecropping arrange-
ments.Land rights may not be conducive to tree planting when
the state is the de jure owner of all land.In some cases rights to
land are conditional on certain behavior.In matrilocal societies
such as in southern Malawi,husbands’ rights to land are condi-
tional on their continued marriage to the wife,and in patrilocal
societies women do much of the agricultural work but lose their
rights if the marriage ends.In parts of Africa,women may lack
individual rights to plant trees that produce direct consumer
products,although they may be allowed to plant trees for other
purposes.Local custom or law often defines specific types of
rights,such as the rights of neighbors to harvest products from
farm boundary plantings or to plant trees that will block the
sunlight to a neighbor’s house.
The importance of tree tenure must also be considered at a
landscape level.Where farmers have unfettered access to trees
in woodlands or forests,their incentives to plant trees on their
own land are reduced,even if their rights to plant are unques-
tioned.By the same token,if farmers lose access rights to
communal land,such as when land is designated a restricted
conservation area,incentives to plant trees in household plots
might increase.In strong communal land tenure systems,
communities may be encouraged to establish agroforestry
systems that provide communal benefits,such as riverine vegeta-
tion or common dry season tree fodder reserves.
In customary tenure systems,individual rights to land are
granted to those who invest in the land.In the past the major
Relative Importance of Property Rights and
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investment required to open up new land consisted of clearing
trees,and so deforestation became associated with increased
individual tenure security.Today,with virgin land all but disap-
pearing,new types of investments are more commonly made to
secure tenure on customary lands.Tree planting happens to be
one of the easiest and most durable investments people can
make to prevent the emergence of claims to the land from
other family members, villagers, or authorities. In situations
where tree planting can enhance tenure security, it is not
necessarily the initial level of tenure security that determines
the extent of tree planting, but the expected tenure security at
the time the benefits accrue.As a result, one may well observe
significant tree planting in areas where tenure security is
perceived to be relatively low.This tendency also applies to the
state. Establishing plantations on customary land can be a way
for the state to reassert its rights over customary legal
systems.This larger goal of expanding control explains why
local communities in various parts of Southeast Asia have
burned or encroached on state-run eucalyptus plantations.
COLLECTIVE ACTION AND AGROFORESTRY 
Most agroforestry systems can be established on individual
plots and managed without explicit collective action. But
collective action can increase the effectiveness of agroforestry,
either by reducing risks or costs or by enabling positive exter-
nalities to occur. Examples include collecting and mixing tree
seeds to prevent genetic deterioration, managing group
nurseries to take advantage of scarce water sources, estab-
lishing grazing rules to prevent browsing of seedlings, and
collectively guarding valuable tree stands to reduce protection
costs.
For agroforestry systems intended to produce community-
wide agricultural or environmental benefits, other types of
collective action are essential for establishment and manage-
ment. Examples include the coordinated planting of trees to
reduce soil erosion in a watershed or to establish a communi-
tywide windbreak (such as was done to protect dairy calves
and coffee trees in Costa Rica) and the joint fencing of lands
to restore natural woody vegetation for biodiversity and water
management (as has been done by large farms in Australia).
These examples of collective action for agroforestry are seen
throughout the world.
Although nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) or
external projects often attempt to create new local organiza-
tions to carry out such activities, mobilizing existing local
groups can be more effective over the long term. Even if the
work is new to these existing groups, they can be successful
because social capital (trust and mutual obligations) and orga-
nizational systems are already established.
RELEVANT LESSONS FOR AGROFORESTRY
As shown in the figure, the importance of property rights or
collective action arrangements for management incentives will
depend on the particular agroforestry-related task, product, or
service being evaluated. Consider the difference between
timber and nontimber forest products. In the case of a timber
plantation (lower right portion of the figure), incentives to
invest and manage determine the level of benefits received.
Since it is relatively simple to detect harvesting activities and
the size of timber area is often limited, it is easy to protect the
trees. In such a case, a clear private property rights system
leads to an efficient management outcome. In the case of
woodlands (upper left portion of the figure), the protection of
nontimber products is costly but tree management is not very
important because of relatively low returns to improved
management for these lower-value products. In this case,
collective protection under a common property regime system
often works best. Finally, effective property rights or collective
action arrangements need not be formalized. In many examples
throughout the world, indigenous systems provide appropriate
incentives for the development of agroforestry systems.
Social institutions for property rights and collective action
clearly shape agroforestry investments.Agroforestry develop-
ment initiatives must consider these institutions as they work
with local people to identify suitable tree species, agroforestry
systems, planting sites, and management systems. In the short
term, there may be limited scope to modify these institutions
but considerable room to work creatively within them. Over
the medium to long term, the development of property rights
and organizations for collective action will be critical to
improved land management, including agroforestry.
In the future, property rights and collective action will play
increasingly pivotal roles in defining rights and responsibilities
over the externalities of tree management practices.As stake-
holders recognize the need for effective management of, for
example, the erosion resulting from tree felling or rights to
carbon sequestration from tree planting, they will increasingly
value and depend on the institutions that protect their 
property rights.  
For further reading see R. Meinzen-Dick,A. Knox, F. Place,
and B. Swallow, eds., Innovation in Natural Resource
Management:The Role of Property Rights and Collective Action
in Developing Countries (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University
Press, 2002); K. Otsuka and F. Place, eds., Land Tenure and
Natural Resource Management:A Comparative Study of
Agrarian Communities in Asia and Africa (Baltimore: Johns
Hopkins University Press, 2001).
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Irrigation, Collective Action, and Property Rights 
DOUGLAS L. VERMILLION
A
pproximately 40 percent of the world’s food and 60
percent of its grain is produced under irrigation. Between
1900 and 1950 the total area under irrigation worldwide nearly
doubled, rising from about 48 million to 94 million hectares, and
by 2000 it had more than doubled again, reaching 240 million
hectares.This dramatic expansion in irrigated area has
produced an enormous and expensive infrastructure.
Governments already straining under fiscal deficits often find
themselves unable to meet the costs of adequately operating,
maintaining, rehabilitating, and upgrading these systems without
enlisting user participation.
SHIFT IN ROLES BETWEEN GOVERNMENTS AND
WATER USERS
Governments are now shifting their role from direct manage-
ment of irrigation systems to regulation of the water sector,
provision of support services to water user associations, and
capacity building among water user associations and irrigation
service providers. During the past two decades more than 40
developing countries in Africa,Asia, Latin America, and the
Middle East have adopted programs to transfer the manage-
ment of irrigation systems from government agencies to water
user associations. Sometimes irrigation management transfer
programs have focused on organizing water user associations
and assigning responsibilities to them but have not transferred
appropriate property rights and authority nor provided
strategic planning to change the roles and modalities of
government.There have not been adequate incentives and
accountability mechanisms for all parties concerned.
STATE- AND FARMER-SPONSORED INVESTMENT
Water users are not normally active contributors to state-
sponsored irrigation projects.These users usually have no sense
of ownership of or responsibility for irrigation systems that are
built,repaired,and staffed by governments. Since water user
associations are not generally formed before construction,
farmers do not participate in decisionmaking and their water
rights within the irrigation system are not clearly defined.For
these reasons,and because the water service is so often poorly
defined and provided,farmers are unwilling to pay irrigation
service fees.When governments are unable to mobilize
adequate resources to finance irrigation,the condition of infra-
structure and the quality of water services decline further.
By contrast, traditional irrigation systems have been
developed and managed by local farmer groups in many parts
of the world. In many cases such systems have been operated,
maintained, and improved by local people for decades and even
centuries. Research shows that a fundamental reason for their
long-term viability is that they are founded on locally derived
principles of water and land rights, rules, and obligations.Water
rights are often embedded in the infrastructure itself. For
example, many systems use proportioning weirs—structures
that divide shares of water to fields on the basis of propor-
tional rights to water allocated by the local community.Those
shares, or water rights, are often based on farmers’ previous
investments in collectively developing or maintaining the
system. Obligations of water users are linked to property
rights through community-based rules that are in turn backed
by the social force of the community.
Such traditions sometimes break down in the face of
state-sponsored development. In South Sumatra, Indonesia, for
example, the government, with no participation from the local
community, installed a water division box on a site where
farmers had previously used a traditional water-proportioning
weir.After construction of the new division box, the farmers
promptly reinstalled their proportioning weir just below it.This
case illustrates the importance of designing property rights,
local institutions, and infrastructure in an integrated way.
The limitations of state-sponsored irrigation are now
widely recognized. For irrigation systems to be productive and
sustainable, water users must play a larger role in their gover-
nance, financing, and management.To motivate water users to
act collectively in support of the system, decisionmakers must
adopt democratic processes with appropriate incentives and
accountability arrangements.
PROPERTY RIGHTS FOR WATER USERS
The most important incentives for gaining the support of water
user associations are clear and recognized rights over water,
land,and infrastructure.The most important of these rights
include the following:
•  the right to use,both on individual farms and for the irriga-
tion system as a whole,a certain amount or share of water
of an acceptable quality;
•  the right to cultivate land and choose what crops to plant,
with collective protection against conversion of irrigated
land to other uses;
•  the right to use,repair,and improve irrigation infrastructure;
•  the right to determine what irrigation services will be
provided and by whom;
•  the right to adopt rules,irrigation service plans,and budgets;
•  the right to establish,collect,and use an irrigation service
fee (without having to transmit the funds to the govern-
ment);
•  the right to assign penalties, settle disputes, and obtain
legal support;
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•  the right to give consent to or refuse external assistance;
and
•  the right to maintain representation in a higher-level public
council at the river basin or district level.
Agriculture and economic policies can have a profound
effect on farmer incentives to invest in irrigation. In many
countries, inexpensive imports, low crop prices, and high input
prices result in low or nil profit margins for irrigated agricul-
ture.This constrains the ability of water user associations to
pay more for irrigation services. In some countries it may be
necessary to increase the price of food crops to reflect real
production costs or otherwise earmark consumption taxes to
finance part of the cost of irrigation.
SUSTAINABLE MANAGEMENT OF IRRIGATION
SYSTEMS
Since irrigation systems are integrated hydraulic networks,
their management should also be integrated. For medium and
large-scale irrigation systems, the principle of federating local
water user associations up to higher levels of the system has
been adopted in several states of India and in China, Indonesia,
and Mexico.
For sustainable management of groundwater irrigation, the
aquifer is the unit that should be managed in an integrated way.
Some pilot areas, especially in South Asia, are beginning to
adopt this principle. Local associations of groundwater users
regulate small aquifers or incorporate groundwater manage-
ment into conjunctive management of canal irrigation systems
with irrigation departments. Establishing effective property
rights over groundwater can be difficult because it is often hard
to measure the stock of the resource, its boundaries, and the
movement of the aquifer, or the amount of water extracted.
CONCLUSION
Increasingly,governments are realizing that motivating water
users to take over responsibility for financing and managing irri-
gation systems requires transferring the authority to govern irri-
gation systems to water users as well.Governments should
reorient how they relate to water user associations so that a
new partnership is created to  (1) empower water user associa-
tions with property rights and governing authority,(2) ensure
that governments provide support services and regulate the
sector at the macro level,and (3) establish cost sharing for irri-
gation investment.Irrigation management transfer becomes part
of a more comprehensive,participatory,and strategic reform
process for the irrigation sector.
International experience suggests that successful irrigation
sector reform programs establish both a policy working group
and a national secretariat that help to guide and coordinate the
planning and implementation of the reform process.The process
should include:
•  strategic,participatory planning,
•  research and stakeholder consultations,
•  mobilization of political support,
•  design and adoption of an appropriate policy,legal,institu-
tional,and regulatory framework,
•  strategy to coordinate lending and technical assistance,
•  public awareness campaigns,and
•  monitoring,evaluations,and course corrections.
It is ironic that the huge investments in constructing irriga-
tion systems have not been followed with commensurate invest-
ments in sustainable management of these systems.In order to
meet the growing demand for food in the future under condi-
tions of increasing competition for water,it is vital that farmers
become more active participants in governing and managing irri-
gation systems.  
For further reading see A.Subramanian,N.V.Jagannathan,and
R.Meinzen-Dick,eds.,“User Organizations for Sustainable
Water Services,” World Bank Technical Paper No.354
(Washington,DC:World Bank,1997);D.L.Vermillion and J.A.
Sagardoy,“Transfer of Irrigation Management Services:
Guidelines,” FAO Irrigation and Drainage Paper No.48
(Rome:Food and Agriculture Organization of the United
Nations,1999);E.Ostrom,Crafting Institutions for Self-
Governing Irrigation Systems  (San Francisco:Institute for
Contemporary Studies Press,1992).
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Collective Action and Property Rights in Fisheries Management
MAHFUZUDDIN AHMED,K .K UPERANVISWANATHAN,AND R.A.VALMONTE-SANTOS
U
ntil the late 1960s,villagers on the island of San Salvador in
the Philippines enjoyed open and unrestricted access to an
abundance of coastal resources.In the early 1970s an influx of
migrants,combined with the integration of the village economy
into the international market for aquarium fish and a shift to
destructive fishing operations,ruined the local fishing grounds,
and conflicts erupted.Government claims of full control over
the use and protection of marine and coastal resources did not
stop the depletion or degradation of the resource.
The developing world presents many similar examples
where central government management of fisheries resources is
unable to either reduce overfishing or counteract destructive
fishing methods.The state often lacks the capacity to enforce
property rights and regulations on resource use.
Fisheries are complex and interdependent ecological and
social systems that require integrated management approaches.
The actions of one person or group of users affect the avail-
ability of the resource for others.Managing such common pool
resources requires conscious efforts by a broad range of stake-
holders to organize and craft rules enabling equitable and
sustainable use of the resources for everyone’s benefit.
Collective action is often a prerequisite for the development of
community-based institutions and the devolution of authority
that is required from central to local authorities.
COLLECTIVE ACTION IN FISHERIES
There is extensive evidence that communities can improve the
conditions of the shared resources on which they depend.Over
the past decade,the community of San Salvador has organized
and established,with the help of government intervention,a
marine sanctuary and reserve.An arrangement for community-
based management of coastal resources fostered collective
action by forming and strengthening local organizations.These
organizations became responsible for marine resource manage-
ment and income-generating projects,and they reduced over-
fishing and other destructive practices.A local ordinance banned
fishing within the sanctuary and allowed only nondestructive
fishing methods in the marine reserve.The local municipal
council passed an ordinance providing legal protection for the
sanctuary.From 1988 to 1996,the average fish catch increased,
and living coral cover and the number of coral species doubled.
But not all efforts to establish collective action in fisheries
are successful.Research in Bangladesh suggests that the bound-
aries of the bodies of water,the scale of the resource,and the
type of fishery all play a significant role in determining whether
efforts to foster collective action succeed.Existing property
rights also influenced the types of new institutions for collective
action that could be established.One community in Bangladesh
was unable to regulate access to the closed fishing grounds
where leaseholders had historically controlled access to and
stocking of carp,even after community-based fisheries manage-
ment was introduced and individual leasing was discontinued.
Only through successful collective action was it possible to
protect group rights over individual ones.
PROPERTY RIGHTS ARRANGEMENTS
Private,state,or community control each has its own limitations
in fisheries management.Private ownership often has prohibi-
tively expensive enforcement costs and unequal distributional
outcomes.Direct state control has high information costs and
often lacks monitoring mechanisms,trained personnel,or
financial resources.In some cases community control excludes
the poorest people from access to a common property
resource,increasing inequality.Combining state,private,and
community control over fisheries in imaginative ways can offer
more efficient,equitable,and sustainable management.This
combination is often referred to as co-management.
Co-management in fisheries involves the active participation
and cooperation of government,nongovernmental organizations
(NGOs),organized fishers’ groups,and other stakeholders in
management decisions.It can help build cross-institutional
collective action.It represents a more democratic governance
system than state management because users are more involved
in determining the rights over the fishery and in sharing decision-
making authority.It improves management efficacy by drawing
on local knowledge and securing higher compliance with rules.
AN EXAMPLE OF SUCCESSFUL CO-MANAGEMENT
Fisheries management involves multiple natural and human
settings.San Miguel Bay in the Philippines is a multispecies,multi-
gear bay surrounded by 3 cities and 74 coastal villages whose
major livelihood is fishing. Since the 1980s conventional fisheries
management problems—overfishing, distributional inequity, and
limited economic opportunities—and negative impacts from
various coastal and land-based sectors have been evident.
Here in the 1990s the WorldFish Center conducted an issue-
based,multisectoral,and multidisciplinary analysis (including ecolog-
ical,economic,social,political,and administrative perspectives) that
led to the production of a coastal environmental profile,a technical
report detailing the status of fisheries,and an integrated fisheries
management plan.The management plan included financing and
monitoring schemes,participatory implementation plans involving
diverse organizations and institutional levels,and the establishment
of the San Miguel Bay Fisheries Management Council,composed of
provincial and municipal government representatives,NGOs,
academic institutions,and various local organizations.
San Miguel’s experience highlights (1) the critical role of an
appropriate human perception of the situation;(2) the impor-
tance of collective action and stakeholder participation at key
stages of research,planning,and implementation;(3) the useful-
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ness of structured decision methods for research,planning,and
associated debates;and (4) the efficacy of research combined
with planning efforts to ensure its utilization and relevance on
the one hand and to provide a scientific basis for management
planning on the other.
EMPOWERING COMMUNITIES 
Unfortunately,governments rarely undertake co-management as
a means of empowering fishing communities and increasing
democracy.Instead,governments often consider co-management
an instrument to achieve their objectives more efficiently by
involving fishing communities in the implementation process.Part
of the problem is that the organizational structures of govern-
ment departments have not adapted to the new co-management
concept.Most fisheries departments are still staffed with natural
scientists and are almost exclusively focused on resource conser-
vation rather than on fishing communities’ livelihoods.
Collective action can help to empower poor communities,
as the example of San Salvador Island shows.But effective co-
management requires government to devolve real and substan-
tial rights and responsibilities to representatives of fishing
industry organizations or groups of harvesters to achieve
sustainable resource management.Moreover,devolution of rights
is generally not successful without collective action.
For collective action to succeed,governments and fishers
should meet to discuss problems and their possible solutions
and to develop arrangements for management.Fishers should be
asked to express their concerns and ideas and be given an
opportunity to develop their own organizations,networks,and
coalitions.The government’s role is to provide legitimacy and
accountability for local organizations and help develop collective
action institutions such as community-based and co-management
organizations.Successful long-standing arrangements for marine
fishery co-management,such as in Japan and Norway,all have a
legal foundation.
Where authorities do not devolve some of their powers,
governments can abuse co-management arrangements to extend
control where it was previously absent.Government agencies
need to supplement department staffing with new professional
skills and develop capacity to deal with co-management
processes in several communities simultaneously.Such changes
may require reorienting mindsets both in government organiza-
tions and in communities.
THE CHALLENGES AHEAD  
Despite progress in achieving collective action and co-manage-
ment for fisheries,a number of challenges remain:
• Developing co-management institutions on a larger scale
Many of the problems and issues facing fisheries can be solved
only on provincial,national,or even international levels.Fishery
resources are generally too large to be entirely within the
control of a few communities.In these cases it is imperative to
provide for representation of fishery groups at different levels.
• Reconciling local and global agendas 
Often international agreements on fisheries and local environ-
mental management contradict each other.The government
needs to meet its double obligation of attending to international
agreements while sharing decisionmaking power for fisheries
management with communities.
• Identifying a management knowledge base acceptable to stakeholders
To maintain scientific validity and achieve wide acceptance,co-
management systems need to reconcile both formal scientific
knowledge and fishers’ knowledge.One approach may be to
identify science-based indicators of the status of the resource
system that also reflect fishers’ observations.
• Developing approaches to manage conflicts
Management arrangements may require access rights to be
limited to some resource users and to exclude others,often
resulting in conflicts.Participatory approaches for managing such
conflicts are crucial for successful co-management.
• Reforming existing institutions to empower local communities to
participate in determining management objectives
This step may require substantial changes in governmental
fisheries management agencies and in stakeholders’ perceptions
of their respective roles.
These issues must be addressed in practical experiments
with collective action and co-management.The results need to
be documented and the experiences communicated to others
who may be in the process of establishing or developing collec-
tive action capacity among fishers.  
For further reading see M.Ahmed,A.D.Capistrano,and M.
Hossain,“Experiences of Partnership Models for the Co-
Management of Bangladesh Fisheries,” Fisheries Management
and Ecology 4 (3):233–248;B.Katon,R.S.Pomeroy,and A.
Salamanca,“The Marine Conservation Project for San
Salvador:A Case Study of Fisheries Co-Management in the
Philippines,” Working Paper No.23 (Manila:International
Center for Living Aquatic Resources Management,1997);K.
Kuperan Viswanathan and M.Ahmed,“Communities and
Institutions for Common Property,” Fisheries Co-Management
News,No.10 (Penang,Malaysia:WorldFish Center,2002); G.T.
Silvestre,Integrated Management of Coastal Fisheries:Lessons
from Initiatives in San Miguel Bay,Philippines (Manila:
International Center for Living Aquatic Resources Management,
1996);and K.Kuperan Viswanathan,J. Raakjaer Nielsen,P.
Degnbol,M.Ahmed,M.Hara,and N.Mustapha Raja Abdullah,
“Fisheries Co-Management—Findings from a Worldwide Study:
A Policy Brief” (Manila:WorldFish Center,2003).
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Collaborative Management of Forests
EVA WOLLENBERG,B RUCE CAMPBELL,S HEONA SHACKLETON,D AVID EDMUNDS,AND
PATRICIA SHANLEY
G
overnments around the world increasingly seek to
manage their forests with the collaboration of the people
living nearby. Ministries of forestry or their equivalents usually
do this by offering local people access to selected forest
products or forest land, income from forest resources, or
opportunities for communicating with government forestry
officials. In return, the agency obliges local people to cooperate
in managing the forests around them by protecting existing
forest or by planting trees. Governments claim that the
programs devolve control over forests to local people and
provide more secure livelihoods, as well as help maintain and
regenerate forests. By sharing rights among local groups and
the state, the programs also help to reconcile the resource
claims of local people with those of the national government.
Everybody supposedly wins.
Millions of the rural poor now participate in collaborative
forest management schemes under a variety of tenurial and
organizational arrangements.We examine those arrangements
and ask whether local people have indeed gained more access
to benefits from and control over forests. Our findings suggest
that most co-management projects actually maintain and even
extend central government control.Where communities had
already managed forests in Orissa and Uttarakhand in India, the
government required that they share their incomes with the
state forest department. Governments in many countries
typically predetermine which species can be planted in refor-
estation or agroforestry schemes and what types of organiza-
tions can be given rights to manage forests.Whereas local
people have gained greater legal access to forests and some
might have increased their incomes, many have also lost out.
For example, game areas and plantations have been frequently
established on land used by poorer members of communities
for grazing or cultivation. Local people have also not shown a
consistent interest in forest management.
THE COLLABORATIVE MANAGEMENT MODEL
Collaborative management or “co-management” forest
programs have had a huge impact. In India, more than 63,000
groups have enrolled in joint forest management programs to
regenerate 14 million hectares. In Nepal, 9,000 forest user
groups are trying to regenerate 700,000 hectares of forest. In
Brazil, farmers help to manage 2.2 million hectares as extrac-
tive reserves. Half the districts in Zimbabwe participate in
CAMPFIRE schemes, in which local communities can share
revenues gained from tourist use of wildlife areas.These
programs have generally helped to protect forests and improve
access rights of the rural poor to forest resources but have
often fallen short of their potential to significantly improve the
livelihoods of the poor.
Collective action has been a key feature of organizational
arrangements for co-management.These arrangements have
included (1) corporate,legal organizations of rights holders such
as rubber tappers’ organizations in Brazil,ejidos in Mexico,or
trusts in Botswana;(2) village committees facilitated by govern-
ment departments such as Forest Protection Committees in
India;(3) local government organizations such as Rural District
Councils in Zimbabwe;and (4) multi-stakeholder district struc-
tures aligned to line departments such as the Wildlife
Management Authorities in Zambia.Collective action assists in
co-management by reducing the number of people that forest
agencies must deal with and by bringing together different
groups to play complementary roles in forest management.Even
when governments contract directly with households or individ-
uals,community organizations usually help with the programs,as
in the case of Integrated Social Forestry in the Philippines.
STATE CONTROL 
The organizational arrangements for co-management strongly
influence how much government agencies can control forest
management and outcomes for local people.Forestry agencies
exert more control over decisions about species selection,
harvesting practices,sales,consumption,and the distribution of
benefits where they have devolved management to local govern-
ments or larger-scale organizations.In such cases,the agency’s
interests in timber production,revenue generation,and environ-
mental conservation have often overridden villagers’ interests in
livelihoods.
Forestry agencies exercise control over individuals and
village groups as well by making local organizations accountable
to the agencies rather than to local stakeholders.The agencies
use standardized contractual agreements and regulations that
limit local people’s self-determination.Local people who
organize collectively are better able to mobilize resources and
negotiate for desired benefits.They are able to exert more
influence when they have the direct support of nongovern-
mental organizations (NGOs),donors,federations,and other
external actors.Collective action,both within communities and
together with outside groups,thus helps local people become
more influential stakeholders in co-management arrangements.
Where local groups have managed their own forests without
state intervention,however,they have not necessarily been
better off.Without government support,they often have had
difficulty implementing or enforcing their decisions.
ADDRESSING POVERTY 
Collaborative management has improved formal access to
forests for rural people.Harvesting forest resources helps them
meet subsistence needs and offers a safety net in times of
shortage.Yet local people’s rights to valuable commercial
products such as timber or game remain restricted.Where
FOR FOOD,AGRICULTURE,
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forests yield financial benefits,governments often fail to deliver
local people’s promised share of incomes or deliver them
primarily to local elites.For the poor to benefit substantially
from forest access,they need more secure property rights over
valuable resources. Only rarely have poor communities received
substantial financial benefits,such as in Botswana where 45
families shared about US$125,000 annually from the Chobe
Trust.
Focusing too narrowly on organizing collective action
around managing a single resource such as a forest may divert
potentially productive efforts.Converting forests to agriculture
or other uses or initiating land reform may bring local people
greater economic benefits in many areas.Forest co-management
programs are not sufficient to address poverty.
ORGANIZING COLLECTIVE ACTION:CHALLENGES
FOR THE FUTURE
Co-management has revealed the difficulty of dividing roles,
rights,and responsibilities,especially where the groups involved
have highly divergent interests.Forest agencies have had varying
experiences in organizing collective action.Romantic ideals
about harmonious communities and the local knowledge and
capacities of “traditional peoples” have been counterbalanced by
internal conflict and lack of leadership in many communities and
the difficulty of organizing collective action where local social
capital is weak.Increasing competition and fragmentation of
forests have led to more de facto privatization of land,making it
difficult for communities to organize together around a common
resource.Many co-management efforts rely on outside agents to
facilitate collective action,but sustaining that action has proved
difficult.Other stakeholders,such as local governments or
NGOs,often create their own sets of incentives or pressures
for local people that work against co-management initiatives.
Forest co-management has created a useful institutional
entry point. It now seems time to build more actively on the
lessons learned. State officials and local people have had
different expectations about the process and goals of co-
management. Forest departments have controlled the terms of
co-management and been reluctant to share their benefits.
People in forest areas now must achieve the rights and power
to bring about a fair division of control, responsibility, and
benefits between themselves and the government.
Checks and balances need to be in place to ensure that
local elites or other groups do not monopolize benefits and
decisionmaking.The process should acknowledge the multiple
interests among different groups and give special attention to
the livelihood needs of the poor. Initiatives need to build
better on existing management practices and enhance local
livelihood options.
The current bureaucratic approaches to co-management
do not address the complexity of these different needs.
Frameworks for natural resource management that are
developed locally by stakeholders and then linked to national
objectives are more flexible and responsive to local interests.
In the past it has been difficult for large centralized forest
agencies to accommodate local interests, and local groups have
had little voice in agency decisionmaking.This is changing as
governments decentralize and as the role of NGOs increases.
Choosing the right facilitators and settings for these negotia-
tions is critical for ensuring that the interests of the poor are
met. Experience suggests that local responsiveness will be
higher when institutional arrangements facilitate good commu-
nication and learning among stakeholders.The learning process
should include both local interest groups and national policy-
makers to reflect different interests.Where forestry incomes
are limited and less attractive than incomes from other
sustainable land uses and other activities, the rural poor should
be encouraged to pursue economic options other than
forestry to better meet their needs.
Triggered by past experiences and by the increasing
complexity of demands from different interest groups, the co-
management paradigm is shifting. Management increasingly
involves not just a local group and the government, but a range
of stakeholders, and acknowledges overlapping systems of
management and diverse interests.The actors involved have
recognized that more emphasis is needed on the institutional
and political aspects of management design.Thus forest
management efforts are focusing on negotiation and on frame-
works that emphasize local people’s right to self-determination
and allow for effective representation of rural poor people in
negotiations.The rural poor and their federations and
advocates are bringing a new sophistication to negotiations and
demanding that their voices be heard.  
For further reading see J.-M. Baland and J.-P. Platteau, Halting
Degradation of Natural Resources: Is There a Role for Rural
Communities? (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996); J. Ribot,
Democratic Decentralization of Natural Resources
(Washington, DC:World Resources Institute, 2002); S.
Shackleton, B. Campbell, E.Wollenberg, and D. Edmunds,
“Devolution and Community-Based Natural Resource
Management: Creating Space for Local People to Participate
and Benefit,” Natural Resource Perspective (Overseas
Development Institute), No. 76, 2002.
International Food Policy Research Institute
2033 K Street, N.W. •  Washington, D.C. 20006-1002  •  U.S.A.
Phone: +1-202-862-5600  •  Fax: +1-202-467-4439
Email: ifpri@cgiar.org
www.ifpri.org
CGIAR System-wide Program on
COLLECTIVE ACTION AND 
PROPERTY RIGHTS
www.capri.cgiar.orgFOCUS 11  •  BRIEF 9 OF 16  •  FEBRUARY 2004
COLLECTIVE ACTION AND PROPERTY RIGHTS
FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT
Institutional Options for Managing Rangelands
TIDIANE NGAIDO AND NANCY MCCARTHY
G
arret Hardin’s “tragedy of the commons” theory uses the
example of rangelands to argue that when many people
have access rights to the same resource, there is a potential
for each individual to overuse and underinvest in the resource.
This theory has prompted a debate over the effectiveness 
of common property resource management, especially for
rangelands.
In reality, rangelands have been subject not just to the
open access situation described by Hardin, but to a wide range
of tenure arrangements, with different structures for regulating
access to, use of, and management of rangelands.These include
many customary and tribal institutional arrangements that have
functioned for long periods. Each of these property rights
regimes and institutional options is associated with different
costs for achieving various goals, such as poverty reduction,
equitable access to resources, and sustainable use and manage-
ment of those resources.This brief considers the benefits and
costs of alternative tenure and institutional arrangements and
the impact of existing legal and policy frameworks on the
sustainability and equity of pastoral production systems under
three categories of landownership: (1) state ownership; (2)
individual ownership; and (3) common property.
STATE OWNERSHIP 
Proponents of state involvement maintain that only an external
authority can enforce the best use of,and investment in,
common pool natural resources.They argue that the state has
greater financial resources with which to make large-scale
investments and can bear the risk associated with such invest-
ments better than community members can.Defining the “best”
use rates and investments,however,requires a good deal of
information on local conditions.In most cases government
agencies responsible for state rangelands have only limited
knowledge of agroecological conditions,and even less under-
standing of local rules of use and management.These informa-
tion problems increase the costs of enforcing management
decisions by government agents.Furthermore,in the arid and
semi-arid regions,flexibility and mobility are valuable strategies
for managing spatial and temporal variation in climate.
Centralized government decisionmaking and enforcement struc-
tures are likely to severely reduce this flexibility.Finally,collective
action is likely to be lower under state tenure because pastoral-
ists may fear that claims on returns to investments they make
now on state land will not be recognized in the future.
Nonetheless,a number of different institutional arrange-
ments have been introduced to manage some of these costs,
including the granting of common use rights to communities or
cooperatives,grazing licenses,and leaseholds.
COMMON USE RIGHTS FOR PASTORAL
COMMUNITIES
Some governments provide tacit recognition of pastoral commu-
nities’ use rights and their potential for informally operating
grazing networks.This tacit recognition,however,gives pastoral-
ists only a limited role in management and investment decisions
and an even smaller role in deciding on the evolution of
property rights.Often users do not have the right to reallocate
common land to alternative activities like cropping or reserves,a
situation that limits the capacity of pastoralists to respond to
local conditions.By appropriating pastoral resources and limiting
the role of local-level pastoral institutions,state ownership has
often fostered land use conflicts and the breakdown of collective
action within and across pastoral groups.In particular,where the
state claimed ownership but expended limited resources to
manage rangelands or relied on bureaucrats to implement
management schemes without knowledge of local resources and
institutions,many land use conflicts have arisen and resources
have become degraded.
COMMON USE RIGHTS FOR PASTORAL
ORGANIZATIONS
Numerous projects have attempted to reorganize pastoralists
into cooperatives with the aim of improving rangeland resources
and promoting collective action,but the cooperatives have rarely
been effective managers of rangelands.In theory,the state and
the local organizations could work together to create and
enforce use rules and investment activities,but in practice the
costs of negotiating such rules have often been prohibitive.In
most West Asian countries pastoral cooperatives have mainly
been involved in distributing subsidized feeds.In Jordan,however,
the new herder-driven cooperatives,which have management
rights granted by the state on their traditional pastures,are
getting better range productivity results than state-managed
reserves,without requiring expensive fencing and guarding.This
type of cooperative fosters collective action between members
because members are certain to reap the benefits of their
investments and control access to improved pastures.There
remain,however,concerns about potential conflicts between
cooperative members and nonmembers.In the Sahel,most of
the pastures exclusively used by members of pastoral organiza-
tions reverted to common pastures open to all community
members at the end of the projects.
GRAZING LICENSES
As part of a strategy designed primarily to reverse rangeland
degradation,government-managed grazing reserves grant grazing
licenses.In the best-case scenario,the government has a well-
defined and well-funded investment strategy.Grazing reserves
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are then opened for grazing during specific periods of the year,
and any herder can buy a license,whether or not he or she is a
member of the tribe or community that held traditional claim to
the reserve area.Pastoral communities contribute little to the
management of these reserves,and the main collective action of
community members has often been to hinder state licensing
policies.In Jordan and Syria,this situation has often led to
conflicts between local and nonlocal herd owners.The approach
has also been widely criticized because of the high costs of
fencing and guarding reserves and the lack of community partici-
pation in improving and managing these reserves.
INDIVIDUAL LEASEHOLDS
The practice of granting long-term individual leaseholds on
range resources remains limited. In Botswana, leaseholds have
in some cases led to increased livestock production and
improved rangeland conditions, but the policy has been
strongly criticized on equity grounds. In many cases, people
with previous claims to resources have been dispossessed or
denied further access without compensation.This situation has
led to additional pressures on the now smaller common pool
resource base, increasing range degradation and leading to
conflicts between large and small herd owners.Widespread
individual leaseholds increase the vulnerability of pastoral
communities during droughts by limiting their capacity to move
and negotiate access to neighboring pastures.There is very
little collective action under this system.
In summary, state ownership often does not promote
community stewardship and thus limits collective action and
incentives for members to manage their resources effectively
and make long-term investments. Competing claims between
pastoral communities and states has created situations of
confusion and open access, leading many pastoralists to
challenge both state and traditional range management rules
and activities and in some cases to illegally appropriate
common rangelands.
INDIVIDUAL OWNERSHIP  
In pastoral areas of central Tunisia, individual private property
rights fostered the transformation of pastoral and nomadic
systems into agropastoralist systems. Privatization led to the
wide-scale adoption of fodder crop production, including cacti
and shrubs.The efficiency of this option, however, depends on
the performance of land, purchased input, credit and output
markets, and legal and institutional provisions to reduce land
fragmentation. Obviously, there is potential for misappropria-
tion of land by the politically powerful, and equity issues are
thus of utmost concern.Also, such a system is likely to reduce
herd size, mobility, and collective action within and between
pastoral groups, and consequently pastoralist households may
become more vulnerable to drought.
COMMON PROPERTY
Common property rights for communities make tenure more
secure,but the communities must bear all costs of making,moni-
toring,and enforcing rules regarding rangeland management.
Managing access to and use of resources can be difficult,particu-
larly when benefits and costs are not equally distributed among
community members.Common property rights are generally
granted to a fixed and well-defined group for rangelands with well-
defined boundaries,thereby limiting flexibility and herd mobility.
Nonetheless,under community ownership,local institutions
may keep their traditional roles of managing the resources,
deciding how to allocate resources between pastures and
croplands,and deciding on the nature of the rights to be
allocated to members and nonmembers.These opportunities
may empower local institutions and provide them with the
capacity to mobilize collection action and sustain the livelihoods
of their communities.
Because landowning communities may have difficulties mobi-
lizing financial resources and technical expertise,they may enter
contractual arrangements for improving their resources.Under
such contracts,as in central Tunisia and Morocco,state institu-
tions,generally forest services,are entrusted with the responsi-
bility for improving and managing the resource.After the
improvement of the resource,rights holders purchase grazing or
cutting licenses,and the revenues generated from the licenses are
used to pay off improvement costs.Theoretically,these ranges will
revert to communities once improvement costs are recuperated;
in practice,however,such transfers have often not taken place.
CONCLUSIONS
Achieving efficient,equitable,and sustainable rangeland manage-
ment depends on the costs and benefits of alternative systems.
These costs and benefits,in turn,depend on agroecological,socio-
cultural,and economic characteristics.The conservation and
management of rangelands require not only tenure security,but
also an understanding of local livestock production and risk
management strategies and factors that promote collective
action,which can then be integrated into national policy formu-
lation strategies and project designs.  
For further reading see T.Ngaido,“Pastoral Land Rights,”
paper prepared for the World Bank's Regional Workshop on




Conference on Policy and Institutional Options for the
Management of Rangelands in Dry Areas:Workshop Summary
Paper,” CAPRi Working Paper 23 (Washington,DC:IFPRI,
2002),http://www.capri.cgiar.org/wp/capriwp23.asp;N.
McCarthy,B.Swallow,M.Kirk,and P.Hazell,Property Rights,
Risk,and Livestock Development in Africa (Washington,DC:
IFPRI,2000),http://www.capri.cgiar.org/proprights.asp.
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Property Rights, Collective Action, and Plant Genetic Resources
PABLO EYZAGUIRRE,N ANCY MCCARTHY,M ONICA DI GREGORIO,AND EVAN DENNIS
G
enetic resources are the genetic material in plants and
animals that determine useful traits that people can
conserve, characterize, evaluate, and use to meet their needs.
These resources are not simply the genes encoded in DNA,
but particular expressions of the genes that farmers, scientists,
and plant breeders have recognized and selected. Research has
estimated that the value of increases in crop yields derived
from new genes and genetic modification since 1945 has
amounted to about US$115 billion a year worldwide.
Conservation of genetic resources contributes to plant
genetic diversity, which includes both the combination of
species that constitutes an ecosystem (genetic diversity across
species), as well as the number of different varieties within a
species. Development agencies, researchers, and policymakers
are growing increasingly concerned about the consequences of
the current erosion of genetic diversity.The 1997 FAO (Food
and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations) synthesis
of around 150 country reports states that nearly all countries
report that crop genetic erosion is taking place and that it is a
serious problem. Loss of biodiversity in cultivated and wild
species can increase plants’ vulnerability to insect pests and
diseases, worsen nutrition through declines in the variety of
foods available, reduce the capacity of plant resources to adapt
to changing conditions, and lead to loss of local knowledge
about diversity.These effects can in turn reduce food security,
threaten the sustainability of agricultural production systems,
and jeopardize the livelihoods of rural communities today and
for generations to come.
Many factors affect the conservation of biodiversity,
including demographic changes, technological developments,
national agricultural policies, and economic, social, and cultural
factors. Institutional aspects related to property rights and
collective action play a key role in local plant genetic conserva-
tion outcomes.
PROPERTY RIGHTS TO LAND-BASED RESOURCES
Land and water are crucial “partner resources” needed for the
conservation of genetic resources. In particular land tenure
and water rights are likely to affect in situ conservation (that
is, conservation in natural surroundings, where plants have
developed their distinctive properties) for a variety of reasons:
•  The type and strength of property rights arrangements
affect farmers’ time horizon and investment choices and,
as a consequence, crop diversity.
•  Stronger land use and management rights for farmers can
increase their ability to grow a variety of crops.Where
farmers’ investments are crop specific, however, security
of property rights might lead to less-diversified cropping
patterns.
•  Property rights, together with available genetic resources,
affect people’s capacity to manage variability and risk.
Many traditional communities present “patchwork land-
scapes” with various ecological niches that favor the use
of unique varieties and plant types adapted to those
niches. High genetic diversity reduces risk, and access to a
diverse pool of plant genetic resources improves the long-
term resilience of the agricultural production system in
the face of adverse shocks like drought.
Formal property rights (“laws on the books”) often coexist
with and differ from locally exercised property rights.The
existence of different overlapping arrangements and regulatory
frameworks (legal pluralism) must be taken into account in
order to assess their effects on biodiversity conservation.For
example,in Ethiopia sacred groves managed by the Christian
Coptic churches not only provide landless people with access to
nontimber forest products,but also assure protection to areas
with some of the highest amounts of biodiversity in the country.
Different property rights regimes have different advantages
and disadvantages for biodiversity conservation.For example,
local forest and pasture resources held as common property
enable farmers to avail themselves of a much wider range of
resources than they could if all land were cultivated.In Kenya
the plant Amaranthus graecizans L. is collected from the wild in
communal areas along roadsides and rivers,but it is not culti-
vated in gardens.Common property rights provide landless
poor with access and foster local conservation of this unique
genetic resource.Often when access to communal areas is
restricted,not only are livelihoods affected,but also species lose
their value as the traditions associated with them disappear.
State imposition of new property rights regimes that fail to
account for traditional rights can also affect the maintenance of
local knowledge of specific varieties.For example,in 1975 a
forest ecosystem in Uzbekistan was converted to a protected
nature reserve.As a consequence the surrounding communities
lost access rights to this land,which contains a wild plant species
that had been used locally to cure heart ailments.Having lost
access to this wild species,the local people over time lost the
knowledge of the heart-improving properties of this plant,and
with that,a low-cost health remedy.
THE ROLE OF COLLECTIVE ACTION 
Whereas state provision can often sustain ex situ conservation
(collection and storage of genetic resources to ensure avail-
ability in the future), in situ conservation requires coordination
by farmers and other actors. Both formal and informal
networks can work to increase access to diversity and avail-
ability of genetic variation, or they can work in conflicting
ways, thus reducing diversity. In marginalized and remote areas
where farmers’ own seed systems continue to play a major
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role in meeting farmers’ heterogeneous needs for seed supply,
collective action is especially important.
Germplasm information is composed of both scientific and
local knowledge. Because the state is often ineffective at
acquiring, documenting, and retaining local knowledge, collec-
tive action can provide the means to facilitate the maintenance
of local knowledge. Farmers’ organizations for seed manage-
ment, local seed exchange networks, and seed fairs increase
the information available about plant genetic resources,
contribute to local capacity to conserve local crop varieties,
and increase the possibilities for improving local varieties.
Finally, a group of farmers should be able to maintain more
diversity with a higher chance of accessing new populations
and a lower probability of loss of populations than any indi-
vidual. Strengthening local capacity to undertake collective
action may thus allow farmers and communities to maintain
greater genetic resource diversity.
FARMERS’ AND INDIGENOUS RIGHTS TO 
GENETIC RESOURCES
Local conservation efforts are also affected by international
policies guiding the development of intellectual property rights
for genetic resources. Intellectual property rights, like all other
property rights, provide the rights to the stream of benefits
(including income) from the resource in question.Article 8(j)
of the Convention on Biological Diversity affirms the rights of
local indigenous communities to access and benefit from local
genetic resources.The recently signed International Treaty on
Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture also affects
local rights.
Tracing the contribution of conservation practices to
germplasm development is difficult,a situation that complicates
the assignment of intellectual property rights and affects the
equity of outcomes:
•  Who is eligible to claim rights over a specific type of seed? 
•  When can innovation in genetic resources be considered
the product of an individual or a firm, and when is it a
product of a collective effort by many individuals? 
•  If many individuals are involved, is it possible and effective
to define and assign collective rights to plant genetic
resources?
Although society has paid significant attention to the private
actions and ownership (mainly by firms) that underpin genetic
resource innovation using biotechnology,it has paid less attention
to property rights of agrarian communities and cultures for
whom genetic resources are essential livelihood assets.
In the case of biotechnology, genetic resource innovations
are treated as individual property. On the other hand, farming
communities use genetic resources to meet a variety of liveli-
hood, environmental, and cultural needs, and innovations in
genetic resources over time are often the product of long-
term collective efforts, such that no single individual can claim
to be owner or originator of the innovation process and the
resulting genetic resources.
The rules assigning property rights over genetic resources
to individuals or groups of users will affect people’s livelihoods.
One risk of failing to recognize local indigenous rights is that
external actors might appropriate exclusive rights over genetic
resources they did not, in fact,“innovate.”
Given the neglect of property rights of agrarian communities
and cultures,collective action can help empower farmers to
demand that government bodies guarantee rights to local genetic
diversity to farmers.The other side of the coin is that collective
action can also be used to limit use of germplasm by others,
thereby worsening access and benefits to society as a whole.
RISKS AND PROBLEMS OF EXCLUSIVE PROPERTY
RIGHTS TO GENETIC RESOURCES
Even if local indigenous groups have legally recognized rights to
genetic resources, privatization itself (or the assignment of
exclusive rights) can lead to reduced availability of germplasm.
In particular, assigning exclusive property rights to germplasm
might reduce access to plant genetic material for everyone,
and particularly for poorer farmers, given that often less-
informed, less-educated, and marginalized rural populations are
at a disadvantage in claiming ownership
Policymakers should be aware of the links between
property rights, collective action, and local conservation of
local plant genetic diversity. It is important to take into
account local regulatory frameworks as well as the existence
and overlap of multiple legal systems, try to build on these, and
avoid policies that might in fact reduce access to genetic
diversity for local populations, in order to avoid eroding
genetic diversity and increasing the vulnerability of the poor.  
For further reading see S.Brush,ed.,Genes in the Field:On-
Farm Conservation of Crop Diversity (Ottawa,Canada:
International Development Research Centre,2000);
International Potato Center (CIP)–Users’ Perspectives with
Agricultural Research and Development (UPWARD),
Conservation and Sustainable Use of Agricultural Biodiversity
(Manila,2003),http://www.eseap.cipotato.org/upward/Abstract
/Agrobio-sourcebook.htm;FAO,The State of the World’s Plant
Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture (Rome,1997),
http://www.fao.org/WAICENT/FaoInfo/Agricult/AGP/AGPS/pg
rfa/pdf/swrfull.pdf; J.W.Watson, and P. B. Eyzaguirre, eds.,
Proceedings of the Second International Home Gardens
Workshop: Contribution of Home Gardens to In Situ
Conservation of Plant Genetic Resources in Farming Systems,
17–19 July 2001,Witzenhausen, Germany (Rome: IPGRI, 2002),
http://www.ipgri.cgiar.org/publications/pdf/753.pdf.
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Collective Action in Pest Management
HELLE MUNK RAVNBORG
E
very year, crop and animal pests deprive farmers of signifi-
cant parts of their production. Some estimates suggest
that 10–40 percent of the world’s gross agricultural production
is destroyed by agricultural pests.These pests include a huge
variety of different organisms—not only insects, mites, worms,
rodents, and birds, but also, in a broader sense, all harmful
organisms such as fungi, bacteria, viruses and virus-like
organisms, and weeds. The variety of pests and their interac-
tions with other ecosystem conditions make pest problems
very diverse and often complex, so solutions to single pest
problems must vary substantially. Some pests can be controlled
by individual farmers; others are amenable to public programs
like aerial spraying. Many pest management approaches,
however, call for neighbors to work together.
In the 1970s and 1980s the rapid spread of the cassava
mealy bug in Sub-Saharan Africa cut into cassava production
and nearly created a major famine in many areas. Researchers
from the Consultative Group on International Agricultural
Research (CGIAR) succeeded in identifying and mass breeding
a natural predator of the cassava mealy bug—a parasitic wasp
from Paraguay—that was released by airplane over the entire
cassava-growing belt. By the early 1990s the wasps had spread
to a point where a state of ecological balance between the
cassava mealy bug and its predator had been created
throughout Sub-Saharan Africa. Neither extension, additional
investment, or any other action by the farmers was needed.
Once released from the airplane, the wasps reproduced and
dispersed themselves. But in most cases, technical solutions 
to pest problems do not have wings of their own and are not
implemented that easily.The remainder of this brief focuses on
cases where technical solutions alone are not sufficient and 
the collaboration of farmers is crucial for successful pest
management.
FARMER COLLABORATION FOR PEST 
MANAGEMENT
Leaf-cutting ants are a serious problem for farmers in many
parts of Latin America.These ants are capable of destroying 
an entire cassava plot or one or more fruit trees overnight.
There are simple technical options for controlling the ants,
such as the regular pumping of insecticide into the anthill.
Ants, however, do not respect farm boundaries. Farmers who
control anthills on their own fields might still face damage to
their crops caused by ants coming from neighboring fields
where no control measures are taken.
Actions by individual farmers acting alone in cases like
these can also raise new problems.The extensive use of pesti-
cides on some farms may drive pests to fields of others or
cause the pests to develop localized resistance to pesticides.
Likewise, if farmers use pesticides that kill not only the pests
but also their enemies, neighboring farmers who introduce or
encourage the presence of predators may find that their
predator populations never reach a viable size.
Often, the best results occur when the majority of
farmers in an area adopt integrated pest management
practices, such as combining occasional use of pesticides with
crop rotation or intercropping of different crops or varieties.
Convincing neighboring farmers to adopt such practices in a
coordinated fashion is thus key to success.This need is espe-
cially great when the integrated approach involves allowing
some crop losses to achieve greater overall profits, as well as
to reduce environmental pollution and health hazards from
heavy pesticide use.
In such cases, successful pest management has both a
spatial and a temporal dimension. First, it depends upon being
implemented in a coordinated fashion over a wide geographic
area.Thus pest management is more effective if required insti-
tutions are in place to stimulate and facilitate coordinated or
collective management efforts. Second, although in some cases
a pest is controlled once and for all over a short time, in other
cases pest management is a continuous effort that requires
sustained collective action.This commitment in turn requires a
certain degree of stability in the group undertaking the coordi-
nated pest management. Under certain conditions secure
property rights might contribute to ensure such stability, but
they are no guarantee. Many other factors contribute to
farmers’ decisions about whether to continue farming in an
area, such as the existence of alternative livelihood options in
and outside the area, a sense of belonging to an area, and local
cultural and social settings.
GAINING FARMERS’ SUPPORT FOR 
COLLABORATION 
Perhaps the biggest obstacle to coordinated pest management
is the view of farmers as sovereign decisionmakers. In many
places, farmers are reluctant to interfere with the farming
practices of others because this action might be perceived as a
reproach and thus endanger future relationships and perhaps
block future favors.A key challenge therefore is to create insti-
tutions through which to encourage neighboring farmers to
participate in coordinated pest management so that the indi-
vidual farmer does not need to approach his or her neighbors.
It is essential that farmers jointly recognize the trans-
boundary nature of pest management problems, because this
recognition helps to legitimize the otherwise socially unaccept-
able interference with the farming practices of others. In the
case of ant control in Colombia, a joint community map of the
location of anthills and their potential radius of crop damage,
FOR FOOD,AGRICULTURE,
AND THE ENVIRONMENTHelle Munk Ravnborg (hmr@diis.dk) is a senior researcher at the Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS) in Copenhagen, Denmark.
superimposed on a map of farm boundaries, provided an
important illustration of the transboundary nature of the ant
control problem.With the help of the map and the backing of
external facilitators, farmers could calculate the average
number of anthills affecting each plot and the number of
anthills actually located on plots belonging to other farmers.
In many cases, external support is needed to help system-
atize the biophysical (such as ecological and entomological)
observations and arguments upon which the need for coordi-
nated pest management is based. Institutions such as farmer
field schools or an agricultural extension service might be
feasible options for providing this external support.
Another important element that helps persuade farmers
to participate in coordinated pest management is the avail-
ability of low-cost, economically feasible technical options for
control.Which options are considered low cost and economi-
cally feasible obviously depends upon the context—that is, the
potential damage caused by the pest as well as the resources
available to the individual farmer. Generally speaking, the more
widespread and severe the damage caused by pest problems
and the less demanding and costly the technical control option,
the easier it will be to persuade farmers to participate in coor-
dinated pest management.
Hence, in areas with no previous experience of coordi-
nated pest management, it is wise to begin by embarking on
pest management problems that
•  are widespread (that is, they should affect the majority of
farmers so that a large proportion of farmers will not
decline to participate in the coordinated pest management
effort);
•  are amenable to low-cost management options so that the
poorest farmers are not prevented from participating in the
coordinated pest management effort; and
•  can be dealt with effectively at a relatively limited spatial
scale so that farmers do not become frustrated at having to
coordinate their pest management efforts with distant and
perhaps unknown farmers.
CONCLUSIONS
Because of the transboundary nature of many pest problems,
technical solutions—whether based on the use of pesticides or
on biological principles—are rarely sufficient.To be effective,
such technical solutions need to be implemented in a coordi-
nated fashion among farmers within a given area. Coordination,
however, often represents a major challenge. Even within a
limited geographical area it is likely that farmers are highly
heterogeneous and that multifaceted and often unequal rela-
tionships exist among them.
Why is it advisable, in areas with no previous experience
of coordinated pest management, to start by embarking on
pest management problems that are widespread, have low-cost
solutions, and are of limited spatial scale? First, meeting these
requirements will increase the likelihood that a sufficient
proportion of farmers within an area will be interested and
able to participate in the coordinated pest management
options. Second, under these conditions it is easier for farmers
to mutually monitor compliance with agreed management
practices.Wide and consistent compliance will, in turn, facilitate
the gradual development of trust among neighboring farmers,
which is so important when, as in integrated pest management,
short-term individual gains must be balanced against longer-
term collective interests.
The implications are that extension approaches such as
farmer field schools should (1) promote an understanding of
the spatial dimensions of pest ecology and (2) provide commu-
nication techniques that will enable groups of farmers to
approach neighboring farmers to invite them to take part in
coordinated pest management.  
For further reading see R. Meinzen-Dick,A. Knox, F. Place,
and B. Swallow, eds., Innovation in Natural Resource
Management:The Role of Property Rights and Collective Action
in Developing Countries (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University
Press, 2002), especially pp. 257–271,“Collective Action in Ant
Control,” by H. M. Ravnborg,A. M. de la Cruz, M. P. Guerrero,
and O.Westermann; J. Pretty, Regenerating Agriculture: Policies
and Practice for Sustainability and Self-Reliance (London:
Earthscan, 1995).
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Property Rights and Collective Action in Watersheds
BRENT SWALLOW,N ANCY JOHNSON,ANNA KNOX,AND RUTH MEINZEN-DICK
WHAT’S SPECIAL ABOUT WATERSHEDS? 
W
atersheds define a terrain united by the flow of water,
nutrients, pollutants, and sediment.Watersheds also link
foresters, farmers, fishers, and urban dwellers in intricate social
relationships. Both factors—the biophysical attributes and the
policy and institutional environments—shape peoples’ liveli-
hoods and interactions within the watershed.
Watersheds are simultaneously managed at various social
and spatial scales, from community-level catchments to
transnational river systems and lake basins.The flow of water,
soil, nutrients, and other materials across a landscape extends
the consequences of decisions about resource use well beyond
the individual land user or manager.These flows produce both
positive and negative downstream outcomes (or externalities).
Upstream pollution by agricultural chemicals can expose
downstream users to economic and health costs. More posi-
tively, upstream soil erosion can transport fertile soil that can
enrich downstream rice paddies or other fields. Because
watersheds have such broad impacts at so many levels, they
raise special issues for the management of resources through
property rights and collective action.
PROPERTY RIGHTS AND WATERSHEDS  
Despite their complexity and diversity, all watersheds share
two keystone resources: water and land. Property rights to
these two resources are often interrelated, as when rights to
agricultural land are accompanied by presumptive rights to its
surface and groundwater. Often, however, water rights are
more dynamic, flexible, and contested than land rights.
Whereas the supply of land is relatively fixed and certain,
water supplies vary depending on rainfall, hydrologic condi-
tions, and amounts extracted by other users. Economic and
urban development increases demand for water for urban and
industrial use as well as for agriculture.Water users with
conditional, secondary, and insecure rights to water are most
vulnerable to dispossession. Markets may increase the value of
water and economic incentives for its efficient use, but the
more water becomes a commodity, the greater the potential
for dispossession of poor and vulnerable groups.
Property rights to land resources generally vary across the
different types of land that make up watersheds. Insecure
property rights to cropland can reduce incentives to invest in
land improvements and conservation structures such as
terraces or trees that could reduce soil erosion and sediment
flows. Usually more important for watershed management
outcomes are property rights to filters—small areas of land
that help to check, divert, absorb, or stop an undesirable flow
of soil, sediment, or pollutants within a watershed. Some types
of filters, such as rice paddies and contour strips, are man-
made and privately owned and managed, whereas others are
naturally occurring and property can range from private to
communal to public.
Rights to land, water, or other benefits need not be
exclusive to be secure; they can be held in common or overlap
with different resource users. Property rights to common or
public lands such as wetlands, riverbanks, forests, footpaths, and
grazing areas are sometimes insecure and contested. In these
situations, community management, public regulation, or co-
management by communities and local government agencies
may be appropriate to enhance access and operation.
Insecurity or conflict over property rights may encourage
extractive use of resources. Experiences from the Sumber Jaya
catchment area of Indonesia illustrate the problems arising
from ill-defined property rights.The management of upper
watershed areas is still dominated by the state.The Forest
Department manages 70 percent of the land where local
people, classified as illegal squatters, live. Conflict over
property rights generates uncertainty about reaping gains on
investments in conserving resources and instead provides
incentives for farmers to clear primary forest land and adopt
farming practices that generate short-term rather than long-
term returns.
COLLECTIVE ACTION AND WATERSHED 
MANAGEMENT
Effective watershed management requires various stakeholders
to coordinate their use of and investments in these resources.
Robust collective management depends on the level of existing
community organization and social capital. Strong norms and
social relations enable people to work together to achieve
their goals.The size and social structure of communities
sharing the watershed influence their ability to stimulate and
sustain collective action. Smaller groups living closer together
are often more unified than larger, dispersed ones in
supporting effective collective action.
Achieving coordination often requires reconciling socially
defined boundaries like villages with physically defined bound-
aries like catchments.Although there are technical reasons to
use catchments as natural units when applying a watershed
approach to natural resource management,organizing collective
action along strict hydrological boundaries is difficult.
Hydrological features of watersheds or subwatersheds rarely
correspond to the village,the district,or other social or admin-
istrative unit.The best solution to this problem may be to work
within social boundaries,applying a watershed approach.The
“focal area approach” used in Kenya gives preference to social,
rather than hydrological, boundaries, making it easier to
stimulate collective action for managing the resources.
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Furthermore, the scale at which the physical environment
is optimally managed may not correspond to any one decision-
making body in a community. In that case, collective action
within existing institutions or through the creation of new
institutions becomes critical for managing watershed
resources. Decisionmaking does not have to be embedded in
only one body at one level, but different management responsi-
bilities can be devolved to different bodies.These options vary
according to the size of the watershed, the populations
occupying the watershed, and how the scale and interaction of
resource flows affect people.
STAKEHOLDER PARTICIPATION IN WATERSHED
MANAGEMENT 
The extensive nature of resources and the interdependency of
users within a watershed underscore the need for broad
stakeholder participation in developing and implementing
watershed management technologies and practices.When
stakeholders do not have an opportunity to participate, the
complexity of local realities and the promise of local solutions
may be overlooked. Recent evidence suggests that participa-
tory watershed development projects are more successful than
externally managed, top-down,“one-size-fits-all” projects.
Achieving effective participation can be challenging
because stakeholders often differ greatly in their social,
economic, and political power and access.There is always the
risk that more powerful stakeholders will negotiate solutions
more beneficial to themselves. Downstream cropland owners
may reap the benefits of improved water and reduced
sediment flows, while less-favored groups, such as women and
pastoralist households, find themselves restricted from grazing
and collecting firewood in riverine areas. Including women and
other less-favored groups in stakeholder consultations could
lead researchers or policymakers to consider alternative land
use and conservation strategies that would minimize negative
impacts on them. Excluding them could undermine the effec-
tiveness of policies if adversely affected groups fail to comply.
Socially optimal resource management calls for collective
action in negotiation, decisionmaking, management, and conflict
resolution among all watershed stakeholders.
Effective democratic forums help provide poor and
marginalized members of the community with a greater voice
in these processes.Where such forums are weak, less enfran-
chised groups may need help in asserting their interests. New
types of organizations that build on but do not duplicate
existing ones and that incorporate more of the stakeholders
with interests in watershed management have a key role to
play in bridging gaps between local community organizations.
External organizations can facilitate, support, and reduce the
costs associated with these multi-stakeholder negotiation
processes.
Stakeholders who participate in watershed management
may also reap the rewards of enhanced human and social
capital. By working closely with researchers, farmers can
strengthen their technical knowledge about agriculture and
natural resource management as well as their analytical capaci-
ties for evaluating different technologies.Working as a group,
they can also improve their organizational capacity.As they gain
the confidence to interact with researchers and extension
agents, participating farmers become empowered to address
their own problems by seeking out appropriate information or
advice. Given the dynamic and long-term nature of watershed
management, empowering local communities to take a leading
role is essential.
Watershed systems are highly complex: resources
frequently have many uses and users; resources and the institu-
tions that manage them span multiple scales; and flows and
movements of water, sediment, nutrients, and other substances
such as pesticide and fertilizer chemicals cause the actions of a
few to have far-reaching effects on many. Interdependencies
and conflicts—latent or overt—are inherent in watershed
management. If manipulated secretly, these interdependencies
can cause suspicion, distrust, and possibly violence and retard
economic progress.When addressed in an open, transparent,
and dynamic manner, these interdependencies can be the foun-
dation of political cooperation, economic development, and
social cohesion.  
For further reading see Water Policy (Vol. 3, Issue 6),April
2002; D. Grey, Beyond the River:The Benefits of Cooperation on
International Rivers, (Stockholm: International Water
Symposium, 2002); R. Meinzen-Dick and R. Pradhan,“Legal
Pluralism and Dynamic Property Rights,” CAPRi Working
Paper 22 (Washington, DC: IFPRI, 2002),
http://www.capri.cgiar.org/pdf/capriwp22.pdf; and B. R. Bruns
and R. S. Meinzen-Dick, eds., Negotiating Water Rights
(London and New Delhi:Vistaar and ITDG, 2000).
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Property Rights, Collective Action, and Agribusiness 
NANCY JOHNSON AND JULIO A. BERDEGUÉ
G
overnments and research and development organizations
are increasingly interested in understanding and
promoting rural agroenterprises as a way to combat rural
poverty.Attention to rural agroenterprises and processes of
agroindustrialization in general are related to two fundamental
global economic tendencies. First, increasing income levels and
demographic changes such as increased female labor force
participation have fueled demand for high-value and processed
products.At the policy level, structural adjustment and liberal-
ization policies have reduced barriers to trade globally and
allowed markets to reach even the most isolated rural areas.
Taken together, these trends are fueling a process of agroindus-
trialization that is transforming agriculture in the developing
world.The changes are most visible in Asia and Latin America,
but Africa is beginning to show similar effects.
Agroindustrialization brings major opportunities but also
many challenges, especially to poor farmers and small agroen-
terprise entrepreneurs. Market forces cannot be denied, but
governments and other organizations must be proactive to
ensure that benefits are socially and economically positive and
equitably distributed.
The agroindustrialization process has three main character-
istics. First, there is the growth in off-farm agriculture-related
activities, such as the supply of farm inputs or the processing,
distribution, and sale of farm products.The suppliers, farmers,
and distributors form supply or product chains.The second
characteristic of agroindustrialization is an increased level of
integration among actors in the supply chain, ranging from loose
coordination to contracting and even subsidiary relationships.
Finally, changes in products, technologies, and market structures
accompany these shifts in number and integration of actors.
IMPLICATIONS OF MARKET ORIENTATION FOR
SMALL-SCALE AGRICULTURAL PRODUCERS
Market orientation means adjusting production processes and
products to respond to specific consumer demands and market
signals and trends.Although many small farmers in developing
countries will continue to grow subsistence crops,increased
production for the market is the trend in many countries.What
small farmers grow and how they grow it are increasingly deter-
mined by what urban consumers want.Agroindustries are
important economic actors that link producers with consumers.
Agroindustrialization processes are often accompanied and
stimulated by liberalization of economic policy.This reality
means that agroindustries—and the producers supplying
them—must be competitive internationally to survive.To be
competitive, agroindustries typically work only with those
farmers who produce the best-quality products at the lowest
possible cost. Often, the competitiveness of the agroindustry is
strengthened through strict grades and standards, imposed on
their farmer-suppliers through contracts. In negotiating and
enforcing those contracts, power relationships between agroin-
dustries and farmers—especially small and poor farmers—tend
to be highly asymmetric, favoring industry.
Agroindustrialization processes are often accompanied by
privatization of land and other natural resources.The rationale
is to facilitate the development of markets that permit transfers
of assets toward the highest-productivity uses.Typically this
situation has meant a net transfer of productive assets from
small farmers and poor rural communities to commercial
growers and large-scale corporations, both domestic and multi-
national.Where customary rights and communal ownership
were important, the shift to private property may disadvantage
those whose access rights are not recognized under the new
regime.To the extent that these people are more marginalized
in a society, there is the risk of widening existing inequalities.
Similar patterns can be observed with shifts away from tradi-
tional labor exchanges toward wage labor.
Where the costs of accessing markets are high due to
poor infrastructure, inadequate technology, or information
barriers, collective action can help small producers be more
competitive.A study of Associative Peasant Businesses in Chile
found that cooperation benefited producers in markets where
transaction costs were high and where product differentiation
was important. In traditional markets for undifferentiated
crops, no benefits to association were found.Associations were
also found to be good vehicles for introducing new managerial
and farming practices that enhanced farm profitability. Only
about a fifth of these small farmer associations achieved their
objective of helping their members participate in new markets,
despite extensive government support.The reasons for their
many failures included, among others, their inability (1) to
develop and enforce adequate systems of rules to direct
relations among the members and between each of them and
the organization; (2) to establish effective networks with public
and market agents; and (3) to become competitive in the
market in which they operate. Collective action is not a substi-
tute for competitive behavior, but rather a vehicle for it.
IMPLICATIONS OF INTEGRATION FOR SMALL
FARMS AND FIRMS
More striking than the changes in agricultural products and
practices is the integration that has occurred in agroindustry
over the past decade.The rise of mega-processors and retailers
has resulted in very little produce being traded on the open
market.A striking example is the rise of supermarkets in Latin
America,which in a decade moved from 10–20 percent to
50–60 percent of the retail food sector.Collective action can
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sometimes allow producers to rebalance market power relation-
ships and gain bargaining power in negotiations with big buyers.
A driving force behind this integration is the need to coor-
dinate the timing and quality of purchases and deliveries all along
the supply chain.Perishability was behind early integration,but
other factors relating to economies of scale in the management
of information about consumers and their preferences,for
example,reinforced the trend.
In agricultural production,the increasing use of contracts by
processors reflects this integration. Contracting can be positive
for many farmers, but the smallest ones are often bypassed
because the transaction costs associated with managing the
contract outweigh any productivity advantage the small farmer
might offer. Since contracting is characterized by economies of
scale, collective action among farmers, such as producer associ-
ations, can make them competitive in an integrated supply
chain. Collective action among farmers is,however,difficult to
organize,coordinate,and manage.A similar situation faces small
agroenterprises.Even where farms and firms do not operate
under contract,cooperating can help them negotiate better prices
for inputs and outputs,manage crises,or improve local infrastruc-
ture.
Well-organized farmers have competitive advantages,but
collective action at the local level is not likely to be enough to
allow small rural enterprises to fully exploit new market oppor-
tunities.Whether they are acting individually or collectively,
farms and firms need to stay informed about technological and
managerial innovations as well as emerging market opportunities
in broader networks.A growing array of service providers—
formal and informal,public and private—now exists to offer
technical assistance,from quality control to marketing to
financial planning.Firms that identify and take advantage of these
services are more competitive.A study in Colombia found that a
10 percent increase in the number of relationships that an
agroenterprise maintained with other actors was associated
with increases in income per worker of up to 18 percent.This
means that for farms and firms that participate in technically
demanding,information-intensive supply chains,managing their
relationships can be as important as managing their production
processes.
External contacts are important,but internal relationships
are also key to firm performance and survival.Increased
attention to promoting small enterprises is often accompanied
by a push to form and legalize businesses.Decisions about how
businesses should organize themselves are often made on the
basis of legal costs and potential access to government subsidies
for certain types of businesses.Different organizational struc-
tures,however,have fundamental differences that firms need to
consider.Cooperative forms of organization are based on
economic and social objectives and require high levels of
commitment and collective action to function.In practice these
levels of commitment are often hard to maintain,even if the
groups are subsidized. Partnerships have lower legal and admin-
istrative costs,but they assume high levels of trust among the
partners,a condition reflected in the shared,unlimited liability
for the firm’s obligations.Corporations have the highest adminis-
trative costs,but they may be the best structure for firms where
investors do not share high levels of trust and are likely to
change frequently.Evidence from Colombia shows that no one
organizational structure is best for either economic perform-
ance or social impact.The appropriate structure depends on the
individual characteristics and objectives of the members.
CONCLUSIONS
Agroindustrialization is transforming agriculture and rural
communities in developing countries.As a result,farmers and
entrepreneurs need to change the way they do business.Part of
the solution is precisely that:to think about and organize them-
selves as a business and to be more attentive to market signals
and opportunities.Because they are in markets that are not
perfect,investment in collective action and networking can bring
high returns.
The reality of agroindustrialization also means that the
public and private sector research and development organiza-
tions that support agriculture and rural development must
reevaluate how best to support agroenterprise development
through policy,technology,and institutional innovations.High-
value products and opportunities for adding value should
complement the focus on productivity improvement in undiffer-
entiated commodities.Capacity building in business skills,accom-
panied by more and higher-quality business development
services,can improve the competitiveness of small rural busi-
nesses.A better understanding of how to develop and support
networks and innovative forms of organization beyond tradi-
tional agricultural cooperatives is also needed.On a more funda-
mental level,organizational and institutional innovations often
arise in response to high transaction costs associated with
market failures.Ameliorating these market failures,especially in
the area of information and communication,will contribute to a
more efficient and equitable agribusiness sector.  
For further reading see T.Reardon and J.A.Berdegué,“The
Rapid Rise of Supermarkets in Latin America:Challenges and
Opportunities for Development,” Development Policy Review,
September 2002,20 (4):371–388;J.A.Berdegué and G.
Escobar,“Agricultural Knowledge and Information Systems
and Poverty Reduction” AKIS Discussion Paper (Washington,
D.C.:World Bank,2001),http://lnweb18.worldbank.org/ESSD/
essdext.nsf/26DocByUnid/95644AEDD7FE7F3785256B9E0014
4BAD/$FILE/Akis_and_poverty.pdf;a summary of this paper
was published by the Overseas Development Institute as J.A.
Berdegué and G.Escobar,“Rural Diversity,Agricultural
Innovation Policies,and Poverty Reduction,” AgREN Network
Paper 122 (London:Overseas Development Institute,2002).
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Farmer Research and Extension
ANNA KNOX AND NINA LILJA
L
ocal innovation is the key to sustainable improvement in 
agricultural production, natural resource management, and
rural livelihood systems. One of the main lessons of participa-
tory research is that involving stakeholders in the early stages
of research and development leads to better targeting of tech-
nologies, a greater sense of local ownership, and often more
economically secure livelihoods. Participatory research
approaches have been shown to reduce the time between the
initiation of research and the adoption of new technologies
and to increase both the rate and speed of adoption.The
process of participating in research can also have a significant
impact on farmers’ human and social capital.
Combining technical innovations with collective action
initiatives has been shown to lead to substantial farmer benefits.
A number of farmer-led research and extension (FRE)
approaches incorporate collective action for different purposes
and at different stages in the innovation process. Collective
action can be useful in sharing knowledge, setting priorities, and
experimenting with, evaluating, and disseminating technologies.
Participatory research and collective action tend to
reinforce one another.Where strong norms of collective action
and social capital exist, they create a climate conducive to joint
experimentation and sharing of innovation. Collective action
can be instrumental in motivating participation, coordinating
the actions of multiple resource users, spreading risks,
managing environmental spillovers, and scaling up the benefits
of participatory research.When seeded by external facilitation
and scientific partnership, a carefully nurtured process of
participation also has the potential to strengthen social
networking, cooperation, and organization.
COLLECTIVE ACTION RESEARCH PROGRAMS
Farmers and communities have used a range of FRE approaches
based on collective action.This section describes some of the
most widely applied participatory research approaches.
Farmer field schools (FFSs) emerged in Indonesia in 1986. By
1998 more than 1 million farmers had participated in FFSs in
Indonesia alone, and the method had spread to 12 Asian
countries. It also appeared in many African and Latin American
countries, and the approach continues to spread globally.
The method typically brings together 20–25 farmers from
a community for intensive, field-based learning by doing. It has
been used mainly to train farmers in the principles of inte-
grated pest management (IPM). Collective action in IPM is
critical because reducing pest infestation depends on wide-
spread adoption of the practices. FFS training, tools, and
dynamics aim to build solidarity among participants, thereby
promoting knowledge sharing, experimentation, adoption, and
diffusion. In one Indonesian case, farmers broadened the scope
of the project from targeting a single pest to adopting a more
integrated crop management program for cassava production.
Farmers employing the new method achieved a higher net
income.
Local agriculture research committees (known by their Spanish
acronym, CIALs) provide farmer-led research on crop technolo-
gies to communities. Communities interested in forming a
CIAL elect a small team of community members to undertake
the research.Through partnerships between farmers, extension
workers, and scientists, researchers learn about the farmers’
priorities and filter those up to research organizations to
shape technology development.At the same time, farmers
learn skills in research design and experimentation and gain
access to information on new technologies from the scientists.
Unlike the farmer field schools, CIALs are permanent and
provide ongoing services.The two approaches are increasingly
used to complement each other.
Because CIALs work to bring communities together to
identify research priorities and learn from their results, their
viability depends on large-scale cooperation and support. Joint
experimentation is also fundamental. Collective action helps to
spread both the experimentation risks and the labor burden,
while also enabling more extensive and verifiable experiments.
In Colombia and Honduras, CIALs have formed second-order
organizations to provide credit, organize exchange visits, and
train experienced members to become facilitators who can
organize new CIALs.
Farmer research groups (FRGs) also carry out joint scientific
experiments.They differ from the CIALs in size (FRGs have
between 10 and 45 members) and because their members
participate for themselves as individuals,rather than on behalf of
the community. Often they build on existing local organizations.
A study of 21 FRGs in Kabale, Uganda, revealed that
participation in these groups follows a U-shaped pattern.
Participation is initially high when groups are formed, then
declines as members drop out and motivation wanes. Once
groups show successful results, more farmers join.The poorest
farmers appear to participate in equal numbers with less-poor
farmers, and women tend to dominate FRG membership,
although men tend to occupy leadership roles in mixed groups.
Experiments are undertaken on a shared plot that is
either rented by or donated to the group.All phases of experi-
mentation, from land preparation to harvesting, are imple-
mented collectively. Members develop common rules for the
group’s operation and membership. Including a sociologist
among the external researchers collaborating with the group is
instrumental in building the group’s organizational capacity.
Farmer innovation approaches (FIAs) in Africa identify 
farmer innovators to promote indigenous knowledge.Their
focus is mainly on soil and water conservation technologies.
FOR FOOD,AGRICULTURE,
AND THE ENVIRONMENTResearchers and extension workers learn from and provide
technical assistance to farmers on the technologies that
farmers have already developed or help them to develop moni-
toring and evaluation processes. Researchers do not generally
introduce new technology options.
Collective action takes place not during innovation, but
rather during dissemination of the technology and its princi-
ples, as networks of local innovators are formed.These groups
not only investigate one another’s innovations, but also visit
farmer innovators outside their regions and host other
community members on their farms to exhibit their innova-
tions and disseminate their knowledge.
Networking helps build innovators’ self-esteem and
strengthens their relationships with researchers and extension
workers. Sponsoring programs actively promote individual
innovators, not only locally, but also nationally and internation-
ally, so that prestige and exposure are among the incentives for
participation.
HOW DO FRE APPROACHES COMPARE WITH
CONVENTIONAL RESEARCH? 
Much participatory research focuses on farm- and plot-level
technologies. FRE approaches that address landscape-level
resources and technologies, particularly those held in common,
are still the exception. Even participatory watershed research,
which starts with a landscape perspective, is mostly oriented
toward on-farm soil and water conservation measures.
Addressing landscape-level resource management using FRE
will undoubtedly require even greater attention to collective
action than is already employed in crop and farm technology
research.The challenges of fostering successful collective action
around natural resource management technologies currently
lead programs to focus on less complex systems.
The collective action needs for participatory research can
be seen as a continuum (see the figure). On one end of the
continuum are resources that are managed by individuals or
households at a plot level and that generate few spillovers for
their neighbors. Midway on the continuum are resources that
encompass significant environmental flows, such as water or
soils in a watershed or hillside context; involve many more
stakeholders in resource management; and generate more inno-
vations for their management. On the other end of the
continuum are common property resources, for which both the
costs and the benefits of management are shared by multiple
users who may prioritize the ultimate use of those resources
differently. In this case, research cannot be effective unless all
users are involved and there is agreement on which technolo-
gies are to be tested and the criteria to evaluate them.
Although this framework may be helpful for identifying
important collective action constraints for landscape-level
farmer research and extension, collective action for organizing
farmer participation and knowledge sharing is likely to add
considerable value to on-farm research. Collective action may
also be necessary for effective scaling up of technologies.
Empirical studies show that farmer participatory research, even
if conducted at the farm or plot level, leads to rapid scaling up
of results to landscape levels if the research is sufficiently
linked to local social networks and is designed to enhance
local human and social capacity.
Further stakeholder dialogue and research are needed to
identify which approaches are most effective at strengthening
collective action for FRE so that it
•  better addresses landscape resource issues;
•  fosters greater and more widespread human and social 
capital;and
• accelerates, improves, and scales up the outcomes of the
innovation process.
Ultimately, the goal of refining farmer-led research and
extension in these ways is to improve the livelihoods of the
poor.  
For further reading see the publications available on the
Program on Participatory Research and Gender Analysis
website at http://www.prgaprogram.org/  
Anna Knox (a.knox@cgiar.org) is senior research fellow at the Centro International de Agricultura Tropical (CIAT) in Cali, Colombia; Nina Lilja (n.lilja@cgiar.org)
is a senior scientist with the Program on Participatory Research and Gender Analysis of the Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research (CGIAR).
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Strengthening Collective Action 
BRYAN BRUNS AND PAKPING CHALAD BRUNS
T
hrough collective action,forest users,fishers,irrigators,
herders,and other rural producers can improve and sustain
resources vital for their lives.Inclusive institutions for collective
action empower communities to protect and improve their
livelihoods.Many communities of resource users possess long-
standing traditions of local cooperation,though these traditions
may have been weakened in more recent times.In other cases,
collective action seems absent,even when it ought to offer
substantial benefits for those involved.
What can be done when people seem unable or unwilling
to act together to pursue their interests? Insights on factors
crucial to stimulating and sustaining collective action have come
from abstract game theory,laboratory experiments,historical
research,case studies,and practical experience.This brief draws
on this research to review how citizens,nongovernmental
organizations (NGOs),government agencies,and others can
strengthen collective action.
FACILITATING COLLECTIVE ACTION
Facilitators, community organizers, and similar change agents
have catalyzed communities to organize bottom-up identifica-
tion of priorities, planning, and action. In the Gal Oya irrigation
system in Sri Lanka, institutional organizers helped farmers
organize themselves, transforming a situation of many conflicts
with the irrigation agency and among farmers into one in which
farmers worked together to successfully repair irrigation canals,
equitably share water during shortage, and cooperate effectively
with the irrigation agency in planning and implementing irriga-
tion system rehabilitation.
Facilitators in different programs have included recent
university graduates, retrained agency field staff, local
community members, and “farmer consultants.” Facilitation
approaches have built on earlier methods in community devel-
opment and community organizing, combined with reforms to
enhance the capacity of technical agencies to work with
communities. Facilitators in legal empowerment programs have
helped paralegals and others in the community learn about
their rights and responsibilities and strengthen their ability to
protect local rights and interests.
Changes in policies and regulations and in everyday
attitudes and practices of agency staff can make it much easier
for communities and agencies to work together in managing
resources. Communities may already be capable of organizing
themselves, independently or with modest help, such as in
arranging elections.Where additional stimulus is helpful, facilita-
tors can reduce the initial barriers and costs of organizing. Care
is needed, however, to avoid dependence on facilitators and
instead build sustainable local capacity. Facilitators can reach out
to include poorer and more marginalized people in collective
action.
PARTICIPATORY LEARNING AND ACTION
The popularity of participatory rapid appraisal (PRA) has high-
lighted the rich toolkit of techniques available for analyzing,
planning, implementing, monitoring, and evaluating collective
action in rural development and resource management.The effec-
tiveness of participatory learning and action techniques is
founded on principles of empowerment,community control,and
respect for local knowledge.Joint walkthroughs,transects,sketch
maps,scale models,cropping calendars,matrix ranking,buzz
groups,and other techniques not only quickly generate valid
information and support analysis by stakeholders,but also are fun
for those involved.“Icebreaker” activities and listening skills
exercises help bring groups together and build trust and mutual
understanding. Including a diverse mix of participants—women,
poor people, ethnic minorities, elders, youths, and others—
encourages a full range of concerns to be voiced.Where conflicts
among stakeholders are severe,alternative dispute resolution
methods of negotiation,mediation,and arbitration may be useful.
Participatory application of planning methods such as logical
framework analysis empowers local stakeholders to make
decisions.Integrated pest management,which relies on coordi-
nated action among neighboring farmers,has shown the value of
integrating local and scientific knowledge.Technical tools,such as
geographic information systems and computer models,can
support better-informed decisionmaking by local stakeholders.
Sustaining changes beyond the stages of initial enthusiasm
requires good follow-through from planning to action and a
supportive institutional environment.
REDESIGNING INSTITUTIONS AND INCENTIVES 
When villagers have the authority to determine who harvests
wood and other products from nearby forests,they can better
guard against overexploitation and benefit from improved
management.Many of the problems of initiating and sustaining
collective action can be traced to inadequate incentives and to
institutional arrangements that discourage and displace collective
action.For example,state laws and regulations that deny local
people the right to control local resources leave them unable to
enforce sanctions against violators.In other cases governments
want to delegate responsibilities,such as protection of tree
seedlings,without securing the rights of users to share in the
benefits of harvesting timber and other forest products.
Research has identified key design principles that promote
collective action.Resource management institutions must adapt to
local conditions, offering local organizations the autonomy to
devise and revise their own rules. Participants will address
problems they identify as important, so it is essential that the
actions taken will benefit those involved.Groups need the power
to set boundaries and control access to the resource,to monitor
rule violations, and to enforce sanctions. Rules need to be
workable in terms of local ideas and resources. For example,
FOR FOOD,AGRICULTURE,
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(bruns@cm.ksc.co.th) coordinates participatory watershed management projects in northern Thailand.
fishers find it simpler to control locations and kinds of fishing gear
rather than to regulate the amount that can be caught.Crafting
and applying such rules depends on both local agreements and
adequate legal backing from government.Small face-to-face groups
with strong,shared interests can combine into larger federations.
Where resource boundaries do not fit administrative units,
resource user groups need support to organize themselves in
suitably specialized organizations,backed by necessary legal
authority,that still accommodate village and other administrative
bodies.Incentives matter not just for ordinary resource users,but
also for leaders and for those who spend long hours,often at night
or in bad weather,patrolling forests,canals,or other remote areas.
Local organizations need authority and autonomy to establish a
structure that fits their conditions,with adequate incentives for
members and leaders,enforceable sanctions against those who
violate rules,and feedback mechanisms to learn from experience.
POLICY REFORMS 
In programs such as irrigation and forest management,national
governments are partially or fully devolving authority to user
groups or local governments.States are not only withdrawing from
some activities,but are also building capacity to provide new
services such as technical advice,dispute resolution through courts
and other forums,and regulatory arrangements to protect broader
societal concerns.Strengthening the resource tenure of existing
local institutions by,for example,formalizing community rights to
regulate land use,reinforces incentives for collective action.
One of the most powerful tools available for promoting
collective action lies in changing how governments provide
financial assistance.Subsidies can be offered to stimulate,rather
than displace,sustainable collective action.Social funds have
pioneered creative approaches to financing for community infra-
structure development.New approaches to agricultural
extension allow users to choose among a variety of service
providers.Grants,loans,vouchers,and demand-driven “menus”
for training and other services can all be designed to increase
incentives for collective action and local resource mobilization.
HARNESSING SOCIAL ENERGY 
Successful change often depends heavily on intangibles:political
will,trust,reputation,and legitimacy.When these are lacking,
communications strategies—such as political advocacy,public
relations campaigns,training programs,study tours,and dissemi-
nation of success stories—may be ineffective.They may even
backfire,breeding cynicism and disappointment and discrediting
future efforts.Where suitable conditions exist or have been
created,good communications are key to bringing about change.
Assurance that fellow resource users share a willingness to try
new approaches,reinforced by visible support from leaders in
high places in government,can be crucial in changing expecta-
tions and transforming decisions about joining in and supporting
collective action.
POTENTIAL PROBLEMS 
Communities are not homogenous,and attention needs to be
paid to the implications of economic and social differences.
Innovative efforts to initiate collective action should be based on
a pragmatic assessment of the strengths and weaknesses of
communities,markets,and governments and the opportunities
for appropriately combining different institutions.Whereas local
resource users possess valuable knowledge and social links that
help create and enforce rules,governments often retain advan-
tages in providing technical information,resolving disputes,and
strategically promoting wider societal interests such as equity
and environmental sustainability.
Governments have an important role in counterbalancing the
potential for local corruption and other abuses.They can limit
local elites’ efforts to grab the lion’s share of benefits from
collective action.Government’s role includes promoting demo-
cratic processes for choosing leaders and making decisions,estab-
lishing accountability mechanisms for reporting the use of funds,
and taking proactive initiatives to help the poor,excluded,or
disadvantaged to organize themselves and protect their interests.
Pilot projects often pioneer ideas about strengthening collec-
tive action.Success stories have,however,often benefited from
extra attention,special resources,strong charismatic leaders,and
other exceptional factors.Expanding innovations successfully
requires developing approaches suited to actual conditions and
sustainable on a routine basis with ordinary levels of resources.
CONCLUSION 
There is no one best way,no magic bullet or uniform recipe,to
strengthen collective action,in general or within a single sector.
Research on the ecological dynamics of rangelands and fisheries,
for example,has demonstrated the pitfalls of oversimplified
management strategies that assume certain knowledge and
stable conditions,instead emphasizing the need for well-
informed local management able to cope with risk and uncer-
tainty by adapting to changing circumstances.Research and
experience show that reforms to strengthen collective action
need to employ multiple approaches and to be customized by
local resource users to fit their local conditions in ways that
allow for continuing learning and adaptation.  
For further reading,see PLA Notes (www.iied.org) featuring
articles on participatory learning and action approaches;N.
Uphoff,Learning from Gal Oya:Possibilities for Participatory
Development and Post-Newtonian Social Science (Ithaca,NY:
Cornell University Press,1991);R.Meinzen-Dick,A.Knox,and
M.Di Gregorio,eds.,Collective Action,Property Rights,and
Devolution of Natural Resource Management:Exchange of
Knowledge and Implications for Policy (Feldafing,Germany:
German Foundation for International Development [DSE],
2001);E.Ostrom,“Coping with Tragedies of the Commons,”
Annual Review of Political Science 2 (1999):493–535
(http://polisci.annualreviews.org/cgi/content/full/2/1/493).
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Strengthening Property Rights for the Poor
JOHNW. BRUCE
WHO ARE THE LANDED POOR?
A
lthough many of the poor in the developing world are
landless,most of the rural poor have some access to land.
These “landed poor” remain poor not simply because their
holdings are small,but also because their land rights are weak and
insecure.The uncertainty they experience undermines their incen-
tives to make long-term investments in their land or use it
sustainably.Their land has limited economic value because it cannot
legally be transferred.The land users’ weak tenure also limits their
political empowerment.To the extent that land users must rely on
the goodwill of authorities or landlords for continued access to
the land that supports them, their political participation is
inhibited by the threats of those who hold power over them.
The landed poor have many faces:
•  They may hold the land in tenancy passed from father to son,
in which landlordism is a class, caste, or ethnic phenomenon.
Tenancy may have its roots in conquest that created subjects
as well as tenants of the original owners of the land.
•  They may be farmers under a system of leaseholds from the
state or a collective and may be deprived of any long-term
interest in their improvements on the land,even the homes
they have built.Their leases may be full of “development condi-
tions,” opportunities for land administrators to extract bribes
by threatening to find violations and terminate the leases.
•  They may be land reform beneficiaries whose landholdings,
because of neglect, paternalism, or political change, have never
been legally regularized.They may be prohibited from leasing
out the land even if they are ill or have no oxen to plow, or
they may be barred from supplementing their income by
working as hired labor.Without documentation, they may be
forgotten and, after the settlement scheme authority has
gone, vulnerable to land grabs by the powerful.
•  They may be users of forestlands that their families have
occupied and cultivated for a generation but who are barred
from acquiring secure property rights because of its classifica-
tion as a forest.
•  They may hold land under customary tenure systems unrec-
ognized by the state, with no legal basis for resisting the claim
of the official or merchant who one day appears on their land
with a title document granted by the national government.
•  They may be women in societies where land passes from
generation to generation in the male line and who only have
access to land as daughters and wives.When land allocation
decisions are made by men, a widow or divorcee is at the
mercy of her husband’s relatives and may be forced off the
land or required to marry her brother-in-law to protect the
rights to the land she farms.
STRENGTHENING THE PROPERTY RIGHTS OF
THE POOR
Despite these different situations, guidelines can help direct
efforts to strengthen property rights.
•  Trust land users with stronger property rights. It may be argued
they are not ready, they will abuse it, or they need supervi-
sion. But a half-century of experience has shown that owners,
responding to the incentives implicit in ownership, produce
better land husbandry than paternalistic schemes, which soon
sour and often become corrupt.
•  Legislate for stronger property rights.The state must provide a
robust legal framework of rights for land users.Although in
weak states the law often has little impact on the ground, an
adequate legal framework is a first and essential step.
•  Improved property rights means different things in different
contexts. It may mean co-ownership of land for husbands and
wives; empowerment of tenants to buy out their landlords;
provision of unconditional, inheritable land rights to settlers;
or state recognition that customary, community-based rights
stand on a par with land rights created by national statute.
•  Adopt local definitions of tenure security when appropriate.
Adequate tenure security does not necessarily mean
ownership in the Western sense.The question should always
be:What do rural people need? Modest increases in tenure
security can be transformative.Though some systems need
greater transparency and accountability, many customary or
community-based tenure systems can provide adequate
tenure security.
•  Always ask,“Security of tenure for whom?” Consider which
beneficiary is most likely to use the land effectively.Titles are
commonly awarded to male household heads, but others may
be more likely to undertake investments in the land.
•  Protect common property rights.The poor often depend dispro-
portionately on common property resources. Some
resources used in common, such as wetlands, forests, and
pastures, may be secured only by strengthening community
property rights.Tenure security is not only about individual
property rights, but also about legitimate common property
and state rights in some categories of land.
•  Provide for adequate proof of property rights. In urban and
periurban contexts and where rural land is highly valued,
adequate proof may entail formal surveys, titling, and registra-
tion of holdings. Elsewhere, where land rights are of lower
value and transferred largely within the community, adequate
proof may involve demarcating community boundaries and
empowering local communities to maintain simple but
reliable records of individual and family landholdings and
transactions.
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•  Educate people about their rights in land. Government agencies,
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and the private
sector, through campaigns and media initiatives, can all help
educate people about their land rights. Rights not understood
will not be defended, and rights must be defended every day
or they will be lost to the powerful.
•  Establish adequate dispute settlement mechanisms.Rights that
cannot be defended against challenges provide no incentives
and no security.Adequate mechanisms to settle disputes
include adjudication or alternative dispute resolution,in courts
or alternative fora,and must be accessible and affordable.
INSTITUTIONALIZING PROPERTY RIGHTS
REFORMS
The steps identified here will not be achieved overnight.For
most countries it takes 10 years to put successful tenure reform
programs in place and another 20 to implement them satisfacto-
rily.There are numerous pitfalls to be avoided in the process.
•  Be politically astute. Whatever “experts” may see as the advan-
tages of strengthening property rights, politicians often
respond to other signals: new revenues from property taxes
on rapidly appreciating land values, new political constituen-
cies developed by empowering the previously neglected with
property rights, or accommodation of the market-dominant
classes by making land a commodity for raising capital. Painful
compromises among divergent interests and objectives are
needed to achieve reform.
•  Embody new property rights in law. In times of real sea changes
in the political economies of nations, legal reform can be
forgotten and reforms processed administratively, without
firm legal basis.This approach only invites challenges to new
rights later, once the reform is achieved and the political
impetus behind it wanes.
•  Exploit all possibilities for legal change.All avenues,from national
legislation to judicial reform through court decision to
community-based reform of customs, can be effective on the
ground.
•  Constraints in capacity and finance can undermine implementa-
tion. Strengthened property rights systems are costly—they
often require substantial state or community investment in
systems for survey, adjudication, and titling, for registration of
transactions and inheritances, and for dispute resolution.
Many a property rights reform has stalled for lack of financial
support.
•  NGOs can play positive roles in the reform process. Nonstate
organizations of the marginalized can voice the demands of
the poor and press for reforms. Such organizations have skills
in areas like rights education and dispute settlement that are
vital to implementing reforms.
•  Replacing inadequate property rights systems needs care. Where
an existing system of property rights is judged inadequate,
one must be careful in replacing it, particularly where it is
culturally embedded. Attempts at reform of customary
systems that do not succeed in changing behavior can create
confusion and conflict between claims based on custom and
others based in national law.
•  Equitable strengthening of property rights is the goal. The rights
of all stakeholders should be considered together. Reforms to
strengthen the property rights of one individual or group,
especially in customary tenure contexts, should not inadver-
tently weaken the property rights of others.
•  Be alert for unintended consequences. Even well-conceived
reforms can be hijacked by the powerful.A classic case is the
appropriation of common areas by the powerful as land titling
approaches,depriving the poor of a resource upon which they
rely.Vulnerable groups are often unrepresented in local imple-
mentation authorities,and mechanisms must be built into the
implementation process to ensure their participation in reform
processes and reform benefits. And enactment of reforms of
tenancy systems can, if enforcement is weak, lead to the
expulsion of tenants from their holdings by angry landlords.
•  New property rights alone are insufficient. Property rights
reforms, particularly those seeking to strengthen the
marketability of land rights, may be unable to achieve their
goal when credit markets are badly distorted and the credit
supply system is in its infancy.
CONCLUSION  
Strengthening the property rights of the poor is a complex
project.The landed poor are a heterogeneous group who hold
rights to their landed assets in diverse and complicated ways.
Efforts to increase the security of their tenure need to be
sensitive to the specific circumstances that characterize each
case, the existing legal conditions, the strength or weakness of
available financial and property registration systems, the needs
of each group of stakeholders, and the possibilities of unin-
tended consequences. Common property rights must also be
protected.  
For further reading see World Bank, Land Policies for Growth
and Poverty Reduction, Policy Research Report (Washington,
DC:World Bank, 2003); Krishna B. Ghimire, ed.,Whose Land?
Civil Society Perspectives on Land Reform and Rural Poverty
Reduction (Rome: Popular Coalition to Reduce Hunger and
Poverty, International Fund for Agricultural Development, and
United Nations Research Institute for Social Development,
2003); Camilla Toulmin and Julian Quan, eds., Evolving Land
Rights,Policy,and Tenure in Africa (London:Department for Inter-
national Development,Natural Resources Institute,and Inter-
national Institute for Environment and Development,2000).
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